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Abstract 
The issue of productivity change of Chinese economy has attracted much 
attention in recent years. However, most of the empirical studies focus on the state-
owned sector and apply data at the national level. Studies on regional productivity 
differences are rare due to data limitations. 
With the help of newly published data, this thesis employs panel data analysis 
to examine the provincial productivity growth for the period 1953-92. By estimating 
provincial production functions, factors contributing to productivity changes are 
identified. Due to the lack of provincial capital stock data, three different approaches 
are suggested for estimating the provincial production functions. The results indicate 
that most of the provinces have better productivity performance in the reform period. 
In particular, coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu have the 
fastest productivity growth. Besides, our empirical findings suggest that a decrease in 
direct government intervention, an increase in the degree of competitiveness and the 
structural transformation of the economy may have positive effects on productivity. 
On the other hand, the results show that the productivity gap between the coastal area 
and the interior is large and increasing over time, suggesting that although the 
economic reform stimulates faster productivity growth, the regional productivity 
disparity is widening. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis is an attempt to explore regional productivity changes in China. The 
issue of interregional disparities in productivity has attracted much attention in recent 
years. By estimating provincial production functions, factors contributing to productivity 
changes are identified. 
Several empirical studies examining the productivity changes in China do not 
arrive at a consensus on this issue. Most of them focus on the state-owned sector and 
apply data at the national level. Studies on regional productivity differences are rare due 
to data limitations. Although the economic strategy of China since 1979 is often 
perceived to be more concerned with productivity growth rather than with regional 
equality, there are no sufficient empirical studies to support that the productivity growth 
is faster and the provincial productivity gap is widening in the reform era. Based on 
newly released data, this thesis employs provincial panel data to examine the provincial 
productivity growth in the period of 1953-92. We would try to explore whether the 
productivity growth is faster, and the provincial productivity gap is widening in the 
reform period as compared with the pre-reform period. Furthermore, we explore the 
sources of productivity changes at the provincial level in the reform era. In particular we 
will analyze the impacts of government intervention, ownership structure and output 
structure on productivity improvement. 
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Our empirical findings are based on the estimation of provincial production 
function using panel data techniques. In essence, for each province, we postulate a two-
input production function, i.e., 
Y=A(z)f(K,L), (1.1) 
where Y represents net output, and K and L represent capital and labor input respectively; 
A(z) is the technical efficiency index or total factor productivity and z is a vector of 
explanatory variables affecting efficiency. / ( K , L ) can be regarded as a composite index 
of inputs. Under such an interpretation,A(z) is the output per unit of composite input. In 
this thesis, we suggest three different approaches to estimate the provincial production 
functions in order to analyze the productivity before and after reform. 
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter one presents a literature review of 
recent studies on the productivity of the Chinese economy and discusses the motivations 
behinds this study. Chapter two discusses factors that may affect the regional 
productivity growth in China. In Chapter three, we concentrate on the theoretical 
framework. Three estimation methods adopted in the thesis will also be discussed. 
Chapter four presents the estimation results, making use of provincial panel data analysis. 
The sources of productivity growth and the regional productivity differences will also be 
analyzed. Finally, we will compare the empirical results of the three different methods 
and draws some conclusions with respect to the regional development of China. 
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1.1 A Review ofRecent Studies on the Productivity of Chinese Economy 
While many studies have focused on the productivity of the Chinese economy, 
most of them emphasize the productivity changes of specific sectors (mostly the 
industrial sector) rather than the aggregate economy^ due to data problems�. Using 
hypothetical weights for aggregating capital and labor inputs in industry, the World 
Bank(1985) reports that the total factor productivity of the state-owned industrial sector 
declined for the entire 1957-1982 period. Also using the same ad hoc factor weights, 
Tidrick(1986) concludes that China's performance of productivity improvement is 
unsatisfactory. He finds that the total factor productivity in the state-owned industrial 
sector declined at an annual rate ranging from -0.1 percent to -1.2 percent in the period 
1978-83. 
On the other hand, Chen et aL(1988a) use an adjusted data set of independent 
accounting units within the state-owned industry. They exclude the non-industrial 
resources from published factor input data and correct the fixed assets for inflation. 
Through the estimation of annual multifactor productivity levels based on output 
1 There are fairly good data sets on the independent accounting enterprises of state industry or construction 
sectors, in the whole country level or some specific provinces. 
2 To estimate the aggregate production function of the economy, we need to have the series of capital 
stock and labor. However, there are no official statistical data of the capital stock, in the both whole 
country or provincial level of China. 
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elasticities derived from Cobb-Douglas and translog production functions, they find that 
there was a rapid productivity growth in the Chinese state industry during the First Five-
Year Plan years (1953-1957) and again during the recent reform period (1978-1985), with 
the intervening decades (1957-1978) characterized by a slight upward trend in multifactor 
productivity. Based on the Cobb-Douglas functional form, they conclude that the 
productivity growth of the state owned industry accelerated from 0.4 percent during 
1957-1978 to 1.9 percent over 1978-1983, while the translog functional form shows 
productivity accelerating from 1.1 to 2.7 percent. 
Lau and Brada(1990) employ the deterministic frontier production function 
approach for the independent accounting units within the state owned industry for the 
period 1953-1985. They find that the Chinese industry has been characterized by a rate of 
growth oftechnological progress between 1.8 and 3.6 percent per year. They assume that 
all observations in the factor-output space lie on or below the frontier, and that the 
observations on the frontier reflect years when the economy achieve the technically most 
efficient utilization of available resources observed over the sample period. They find that 
the utilization of industrial resources has been suboptimal for much ofthe sample period, 
reflecting the disruption by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. They 
also find that both technical efficiency and total factor productivity increase appreciably 
in the period 1978-1985, suggesting that the reforms have positive impact on industrial 
performance. In contrast with the findings of Chen et al.(1988), Lau and Brada (1990), 
Woo et.al (1994) estimate the production function based on a data set that contains 
production and financial information of 300 large and medium industrial state-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs) over the 1984-1988 period. They find that growth of the total factor 
productivity in SOEs has been zero or negative in the sample period. They suggest that 
the high total factor productivity growth in some studies might have been due to the 
underestimiation of the deflator of gross output and overestimation of deflator of 
intermediate inputs. On the other hand, their analysis of another data set which contains 
production and financial information of 200 town and village enterprises (TVE) in 10 
provinces over the 1984-1987 period suggests that the total factor productivity growth in 
collective sectors is impressive. 
Apart from estimating the level of productivity change in the pre-reform and 
reform era, Jefferson (1989) focus on the potential sources of productivity increase of the 
Chinese industry.^ Using industrial data from 293 counties, he estimates the potential 
sources of productivity growth within four major sectors of Chinese industry - the state 
and collective sectors and the heavy and light industries. He states that in each ofthe four 
sectors, the gains in efficiency are due to scale economies - either enterprise scale 
economies, agglomerative economies, or both. Through the calculation and comparison 
ofthe values of the marginal product of capital and labor between the state and collective 
sectors and between the heavy and light industries, he concludes that the efficiency gains 
are achieved through shifts in factor allocations that take advantage of the higher social 
retums to labor in the state industry relative to the collective industry and in the heavy 
industry relative to the light industry, and the higher retums to capital in the collective 
3 The increase in productivity can be obtained through technical change, scale economies, a more efficient 
allocation ofresources or through a combination of these three sources. For the detailed discussion, see 
Jefferson (1989)，Jefferson(1994). 
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industry and the light industry. To investigate the allocative efficiency at the enterprise 
level, Jefferson and Xu (1994), using panel data for 226 industrial enterprises over the 
period 1980-89, report that during 1980-89, the returns to labor, capital, and materials 
became more equal among large and medium-sized enterprises within China's state 
sector. They also conclude that during the period of reform, there has been a significant 
convergence of technical efficiency of the large and medium-sized enterprises, which 
implies that economic reform has the desired effect of motivating gains in efficient 
production. 
Due to data limitations, there have been relatively few studies on estimating the 
production functions for the aggregate economv at both the national level and the 
provincial level. In order to estimate the effects of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural 
Revolution and the impact of economic reforms since 1979 on productivity of the 
aggregate economy and individual sectors, Chow (1993) constructs capital stock series of 
the aggregate economy from 1952 to 1985 and divides it into five productive sectors^ 
consistent with the Chinese national income accounting system. Treating "accumulation" 
as the net increase in capital stock, he apportions the accumulation of fixed assets and 
circulating funds of the whole economy into those of the five economic sectors, and sums 
these accumulations over time, to form capital stocks in the five sectors with estimated 
initial values in 1952.5 Using his self-constructed capital stock series to estimate the 
production functions of the aggregate economy and the five production sectors, he 
4 The five productive sectors as mentioned are agriculture, industry, construction, transportation and 
commerce. The Chinese national income is equal to the summation of net material output from these five 
productive sectors. 
5 For detailed discussion of the method to estimate the capital stock series, see Chow(1993). 
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concludes that the percentage losses of output in 1962 were about 0.34 for the aggregate 
economy, 0.22 for agriculture, 0.41 for industry, 0.25 for construction, 0.31 for 
transportation, and 0.24 for commerce. The percentage gains in 1985 were about 0.30 for 
the aggregate economy, and from zero to 0.44 for individual sectors. He also concludes 
that there was no technological change in China from 1952 to 1980. Therefore, the 
economic growth of China before 1979 was only based on the large scale injection of 
factor inputs, rather than productivity improvement. 
Comparing the regional productivity differences in China before and after reform 
is also one ofthe interesting research topics. Applying a methodology similar to Chen et 
al. (1988b) in estimating the capital stock series of the state and the collective sectors of 
Chinese industry, Wu (1995) uses panel data of28 provinces in China from 1985 - 1991 
to estimate the production functions for three major sectors: the state industry, rural 
industry, and agriculture. In the paper, he employs a frontier production approach, which 
assumes the existence of an unobservable function of production frontier, which 
corresponds to the set of maximum attainable output levels for a given combination of 
inputs. He then computes technical efficiency by decomposing the residuals of the 
estimated equation of production function into separate estimates of statistical noise and 
technical inefficiency.^ Based on this approach in estimating productivity of the three 
sectors using the provincial statistics of the period 1985 - 1991, he finds that the 
production in these three sectors approaches about 50-60% of best-practice output, which 
6 Wu's (1994) estimation of the technical efficiency has the problem of model misspecification and 
inconsistency, he assumes that the residual term of the estimated production function is a quadratic 
function of time, but it should be a random in OLS estimation. 
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implies that there is much room for improving productivity. Besides, technological 
progress dominates the change in technical efficiency as the main source of total factor 
productivity growth in all three sectors of the economy. While technical efficiency has 
improved in the rural sector, it has been stagnant in the state and agriculture sectors. 
Examining the regional variations in productivity and efficiency, Wu finds that the gap of 
technical efficiency between the coastal region and the other two regions is large in the 
state and the agricultural sectors but small and narrowing over time in the rural industrial 
sector. 
To explore the regional impact of economic reform and the regional difference in 
the productivity of the state sector, Tsui, Rawski and Hsueh (1995) use a data set that 
covers the state-owned industrial independent accounting enterprises in 26 provinces in 
the period 1978-1990. They deduct non-productive service facilities from fixed assets and 
deflate the net value of fixed assets by the national price deflator constructed by Chen et 
al. (1988). They then estimate the regional production function using panel data 
regression analysis. Based on the fixed-effects and random-effects model, they state that 
absolute efficiency increases in 24 provinces (fixed-effects) or 23 provinces (random-
effects), which imply that there has been a technological improvement after 1979. When 
examining the productivity gap between different regions of China, they find that the 
deviation of productivity is surprisingly small. In term of relative efficiency index?, the 
minimum levels are from 0.536 (fixed-effects) or 0.686(random-effects) to 0.667 (fixed-
7 the relative efficiency index for the ith province (Ei) is defined as 
Ei = A/A*， 
where A* = max (A；) is the technical efficiency level of ith province. For detailed discussion, see Tsui et al. 
(1995) and Schmidt and Sickle (1984). 
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effects) or 0.706 (random-effects) in 1990, which are smaller than the results of a study of 
regional manufacturing productivity in the United States which finds that the minimum 
level is 0.37 (fixed-effects) or 0.5 (random-effects). On the other hand, the coefficient of 
variation for estimated provincial productivity declines steadily between 1978 - 1990 
under both fixed-effects and random-effects model. Grouping the provincial data into 
eastern, central and westem regions, they find that not only the inter-regional, but also the 
intra-regional productivity differences are shrinking from 1978 to 1990. This result 
contrasts sharply with the perception of most observers, that the reform process may be 
widening the inequality of productivity between the coastal area and the interior, since 
most of the reform policies are implemented mainly in the coastal area and have given 
disproportional benefits to them. Tsui et al. conclude that the convergence process of 
productivity is “a sign of market forces and competition gradually gaining ground", 
reflecting that the rapid growth of the collective and the private industries have created 
potent competitive pressure on state enterprises. 
Other than estimating the total factor productivity by using the classical 
production function, most of the studies are concentrated in investigating the relationship 
between economic growth and different economic factors, such as the degree of 
openness, government intervention and the degree of decentralization8. gingh and Xiao 
g 
The most common method is : 
Let Y = A*f(K, L); where Y=national income, K=capital stock; L=labor force, A=technical efficiency; 
In logarithmic form it is : 
h i Y = A + odnK + pinL. (1) 
First differencing eq. (1) gets: 
dkiY = dA + adlnK + pdlnL. (2) 
Therefore 
dY/ Y = dA + adK/K + pdL/L; (3) 
where dK equal to the net investment I，Eq (3) can be rewritten as: 
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(1992) regress the provincial growth rates of gross value of industrial output (GVIO) on 
the share of state sector in provincial GVIO, the share of light industry in provincial 
GVIO, and regional dummies, in order to investigate the factors affecting the economic 
growth of China during the reform period of 1978 - 1990. They find that the ownership 
structure, industry orientation and geographical location are strongly correlated with 
economic growth. Mody and Wang (1994) use panel data on the output o f23 industrial 
sectors for seven coastal regions from 1985 to 1989. They fmd a strongly negative 
relationship between industrial growth rates and initial per capita income in a region, 
which supports the hypothesis of long-term convergence between different regions. They 
also fmd that the growth of an industrial sector in any region is clearly influenced by the 
growth of the same industry in other regions throughout the same period, suggesting 
spillover effects between different regions. 
1.2 Aims ofStudy 
As mentioned above, there have been numerous studies focusing on the economic 
growth and productivity of the Chinese economy. Yet, many questions still do not have 
answers. Firstly, most of the previous studies focus on the state-owned sector. However, 
during the reform period, the share of the state-owned sector in the national economy has 
been gradually declining. From 1979 to 1992, the share of the state-owned sector in the 
total industrial output dropped from 77 percent to 48.1 percent. According to the latest 
dY/ Y = dA + a ( W ) * ( K A ' ) + pdL/L; we assume that K7Y is constant. 
Then dY/ Y = dA + y(I/Y) + pdL/L; where y = a(K/Y). 
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figures, over half of the output is produced by the collective or private sector. Therefore, 
studies based on the data of the state-owned sector do not give us a comprehensive 
picture of the impacts of reform. Secondly, most of the previous studies focus on the 
industrial sector rather than the aggregate economy, and thus fail to capture the different 
impacts of reform on different sectors. In particular, the fact that the total factor 
productivity ofthe industrial sector has been improving after the reform as confirmed by 
most studies does not imply that this is true for the aggregate economy. 
Finally, most of the studies focus on the data at the national level. The 
productivity change at the regional level is still a black box in productivity studies. It is 
obvious that the regional development strategies the Chinese government implemented 
before and after 1979 were different. Before 1979, war preparation and the pursuance of 
policies to reduce regional disparities prompted the Chinese government to invest heavily 
in the central and westem region^. Many production lines were shifted from the coastal 
region to the interior. In this context, total fixed capital investment in the interior 
increased from 47.8% in the First Five-Year Plan to 52.7% in the Third Five-Year Plan. 
Since 1970, the economic problems of the planned economy became apparent. Problems 
such as more frequent economic fluctuations, sectoral imbalance and low production 
efficiency caused the central planners to rethink the regional development strategy of 
China. After the Third Plenum ofthe 11th Party Congress in 1979, the central authority 
decided to reform the strictly planned economy based on the principle of "enlivening the 
9 The eastern region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong and Guangxi. 
The central region includes Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi，Henan, Hubei, Hunan. 
The westem region includes Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjian. 
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domestic economy and opening to the outside world". The central government altered its 
regional development strategy and granted privileges in trade, foreign investment, 
taxation etc., to the coastal areas. The economic development of the interior region thus 
became relatively stagnant. Some economists expect that after reform, both income 
distribution and the productivity gap between the coastal and interior area have been 
widening due to unbalanced decentralization policy, while others think that the 
productivity gap was narrowing due to the increasing pressure ofmarket competition and 
more mobile resource flow. 
Tsui et al. (1992) state that the regional productivity gap of the state-owned 
industry is narrowing after 1979. However, since the share of state-owned enterprises 
continues to decline after reform, it cannot be concluded that the productivity of the 
aggregate economy shows the similar pattern. On the other hand, although the central 
government concentrated its investment in the interior before 1979, the technology ofthe 
interior region might not improve during that period. Due to the underutilization of 
capital and inefficient resource allocation, the productivity in the interior might in fact be 
declining rather than improving! 
With the help of newly published data , this thesis tries to answer some of the 
above questions. Firstly, we will construct a data set of capital stock of the material 
production sectors of 14 provinces between 1979 - 1992 . Based on the estimated data set 
and using panel data regression analysis, we study whether the economic reform has a 
positive impact on the total factor productivity, and how the economic reform affects the 
productivity of different regions. It is now well known that China has experienced higher 
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economic growth rate after economic reform. According to the official data, the annual 
growth rate of national income in China increased from 6.72 percent in the period of 
1953-1978 to 8.22 percent in the period of 1978-1992. Besides, most of the coastal 
provinces reported particularly good performance after reform. For example, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Guangdong and Fujian all reported an above-10-percent annual growth rate of 
national income in the period of 1978-1992. Nevertheless, some of the interior provinces 
have been performing relatively poorly. Also, a higher economic growth rate after reform, 
and better economic growth performance in some coastal provinces do not imply that 
productivity is improving. Through an increase in factor inputs, an economy can also 
attain a higher economic growth rate without any productivity improvement. Following 
the production function approach, we can decompose economic growth into the 
contribution by technical improvement and that by factor inputs, and investigate the 
impacts of reform at the provincial level: does reform bring a larger productivity 
improvement to the coastal region than to the interior region? Moreover, we want to 
study whether the reform brings convergence in productivity across different regions. 
In this thesis, we will estimate the aggregate production function using national 
income data rather than the gross domestic product (GDP) data^^. The reason is that the 
provincial data of national income are available from 1952 - 1992, while the GDP data 
are only available after 1978 for most of the provinces. Appendix Three will give a 
10 The definition of China's national income is different from the definition of national income in the west. 
The former is based on the System ofMaterial Balance (MPS), and the latter is based on the System of 
National Accounting (SNA). 
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detailed account of China's national income data and explain how the provincial capital 
stock data are estimated. 
Since we can only construct the capital stock series since 1979 due to data 
limitations, the conventional approach in estimation of production function cannot be 
applied in the study of pre-reform productivity change. To compare the productivity 
before and after reform. Two different methods are used instead of the conventional 
production function approach, included the approach which is commonly used in recent 
growth accounting studies and the approximation of the production function by Taylor 
expansion. Based on the new methods in the estimation of production function, we can 
get a general picture of economic development at the provincial level, and analyze the 
effects of national policies and regional development strategies on the productivity of 
different provinces. 
Another objective of this thesis is to analyze the sources of productivity changes 
in both the pre-reform and reform period. It is obvious that economic reform since 1978 
has been characterized by the decentralization of economic authority from the central 
government to local governments as well as enterprises. Some economists argue that the 
relatively fast productivity growth of the coastal areas may be due to higher local 
government autonomy (Xiao 1992). According to this hypothesis, implementing similar 
policies of decentralization by the interior provinces may improve their productivity as 
well. Contrary to the above viewpoint, some economists argued that recent 
decentralization has weakened the central government's ability to control the economy^\ 
11 Wong (1987) argues that although the reform aims at expanding the authority ofenterprises, the decision 
making power is in fact decentralized to the local governments rather than enterprises, so the beneficiaries 
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On the other hand, most of the studies conclude that the collective sector has a faster 
productivity growth than the state sector (see Jefferson 1989, Jefferson et al. 1992, Singh 
and Xiao 1992, Wu 1995, Xiao 1992). The reforms are more favorable to the 
development of the collectively owned enterprises than the state enterprises, with the 
latter still facing many problems, such as unclear property rights, soft budget constraints 
and bureaucratic intervention by the central government. The increasing share of 
production by the collective sector may correspond to a greater competitive pressure. It is 
thus important to examine the impact of the non-state sector on the productivity of a 
region. Therefore, in this thesis, we assume that technical efficiency is affected by several 
factors, including the government size, the ownership structure and the output structure. 
We will estimate the effect of such factors on the productivity growth based on the three 
different approaches discussed above. Finally, we will compare the results of the three 
different methods. 
ofreform were the local governments, not the enterprises. Therefore the decentralization only stimulate 
regional protectionism rather than local incentive of the enterprises. 
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Chapter 2. The Sources ofProductivity Growth 
In this chapter, we will focus on the sources of provincial productivity growth. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the general production function is defined as: 
Y=A(z)f(K,L). 
where A(z) is the technical efficiency, and z is a vector of explanatory variables 
affecting efficiency. Four factors that are expected to affect the technical efficiency will 
be discussed. 
2.1 Degree of Government Intervention 
Many economists have theorized that government intervention has a negative 
impact on the economy since government investment and production are expected to be 
less efficient than those in the private sector with competitive markets (see Landau 1985). 
Governmental outputs are sub-optimal and produced at higher costs due to centralized 
decision making, the lack of competitive pressures, and no profit motives. If such static 
inefficiencies exist, the average retums to factor inputs and technology will tend to fall as 
the share of government expenditures increases. Also, government investment and 
consumption may crowd out private sector investment. Since the factor inputs are 
expected to be less productive in the public sector than in the private sector, the 
government growth which takes factor inputs away from the more efficient private sector 
will lower allocative efficiency. Besides, an increase in government consumption will 
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increase the amount of distortionary taxation, which brings an efficiency loss due to 
distortion of market prices (Barro 1991). Therefore, an increase in the share of 
government expenditure is expected to has a negative effect on economic growth. A 
number of empirical studies of both developing and developed countries support the 
argument of negative relationship between government size and growth. Landau (1985) 
studies 104 countries on a cross-sectional basis, he finds significantly negative relation 
between the real GDP growth rate and the level of government consumption expenditures 
as a ratio of GDP. Using pooled cross-section, time-series analysis, Grier and Tullock 
(1989) fmd a negative relation between the real GDP growth rate and the share of 
government consumption in both data sets of 24 OECD countries and other 89 countries 
in the period of 1951-1980. Based on a data set of 98 countries in the period of 1960-
1985, Barro (1991) reports that GDP growth is inversely related to the share of 
government consumption in GDP, but insignificantly related to the share of public 
investment. 
As a command economy, the Chinese government intervenes heavily in 
investment, production and distribution. China's pattem of public expenditure is thus 
very different from that of market economies. While a large proportion of the Chinese 
national budget is associated with direct economic intervention, such as basic 
construction investments and enterprises subsidies, the advanced industrialized countries 
concentrate its expenditure on social security and welfare"� When we examine the 
composition ofpublic expenditure by functions in China, a large share is channelled into 
12 See Hsueh and Ouyang (1993)，pp.22. 
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various economic activities, many of which are normally within the domain ofthe private 
sector in market economies. From 1952 to 1979, the share of expenditures on economic 
services in total government expenditure was greater than 50%, and has dropped 
gradually since 1979. In advanced industrialized countries, this share is only about 10 
percent on the average (Hsueh and Ouyang 1993). This reflects that the Chinese 
government is more involved in direct economic activities than in the provision ofpublic 
goods, such as housing, medical health services and education. However, the central 
planner usually does not have detailed information of specific sectors of the economy. It 
is time consuming to send information up and down the government hierarchy. So most 
ofthe government investment projects are expected to be less efficient. Besides, subsidies 
to enterprises also distort market signal and protect inefficient enterprises. Due to the lack 
of price signal and profit motive, the direct government intervention of the economy will 
exert a deleterious effect on productivity improvement rather than promote economic 
growth. Therefore, it has often been argued that the increase in the share of government 
expenditure in national income will result in a decrease in productivity level. In our 
subsequent regression analysis, the share of government expenditure in the national 
income (SG) is a proxy for the degree of government intervention. 
2.2 Ownership structure 
The critique of the monopolistic position of state enterprises in developing 
countries has been well established in the literature. The argument is that state-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs) have generally been an inefficient vehicle for development. Poor 
performance of SOEs is due to various factors including^^ 
-Multiple and contradictory objectives set by governments (for example, SOEs are 
required both to meet profit and social objectives). 
- A lack of management autonomy (for example, managers are restricted by controls 
and regulations that limit their freedom of decision making and force SOEs to 
operate more like government departments than commercial enterprises). 
-Inadequate staffing, particularly at managerial level. 
-With soft budget constraint, SOEs do not have incentive to minimize production 
costs. 
The poor performance of SOEs, particularly in developing countries, is confirmed 
by various studies. Table 2.1 shows that in the 1970s, while SOEs had a smaller share in 
total output in developing countries as a group, their share in total investment was much 
higher than in developed countries. In all countries covered, SOEs operated with financial 
deficit that had to be covered by borrowing or government transfers. And the average size 
ofthe deficits was higher in developing countries (Weiss 1995). 
13 See Weiss(1995), Chapter 8. 
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Table 2.1: Economic activities of state-owned enterprises in 1970s 
SOE share in SOE share in Deficits of 
GDpa gross investment SOE to GDP^ 
(%) (%) (%) 
Developed economies 9.6 15.0 1.7 
Developing economies 8.6 25.2 3.9 
a Weighted average for period 1974-77 
Source: Weiss (1995), Table 8.3 
Elias (1992) estimates the total factor productivity (TFP) of the private and the 
public sectors in seven Latin American countries in 1950 -1980, and concludes that the 
productivity performance of the public sectors in the seven countries is significantly 
poorer than the private sectors. The total factor productivity of state sectors in the seven 
countries were almost negative in different periods. Moreover the negative TFP values 
correspond, in general, to cases with high rates of growth of the public sector's capital-
labor ratios, implying ineffectiveness of large injection of capital investment in raising 
public sector productivity. The World Bank survey (1992, pp.3) concludes that: 
“SOE can be placed on an economic-financial performance spectrum that 
ranges from very good to very bad. Although the same is true for private 
firms, there is considerable evidence indicating that the median point on the 
private enterprise spectrum lies higher than the median on the public 
enterprise spectrum. This is true under all market and country conditions" 
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Recent empirical studies ofthe Chinese economy have stated that the productivity 
levels ofboth the state sector and the non-state sector^^ have been growing in the period 
ofreform. But the growth ofproductivity in the non-state sector is much higher than that 
in the state sector (Jefferson 1989, Singh and Xiao 1992, Wu 1994, Jefferson 1994 etc). 
In the pre-reform period, state enterprises were more like subordinate units ofthe 
government rather than profit-maximizing organizations. They were supervised and 
controlled by the ministries ofthe State Council or by the local governments and received 
funding for fixed capital investment and current working capital directly from the state 
budget. They only had to fulfill production targets which were set by the planners 
according to the state's annual and Five-year plans rather than by the market demand. 
Intermediate inputs were supplied by the state plan to guarantee the fulfillment of 
production targets^^ Their products were then distributed by the bureaus of material 
supplies and commerce. Prices of factor inputs and outputs were controlled by the state, 
so the accounting profit or loss of the enterprises did not reflect production efficiency. 
Since all state enterprises are financially supported by the state, enterprises with soft 
budget constraints were not subjected to the threat of bankruptcy. Thus, workers and 
, 
managers had no incentive to minimize production costs, intensifying the X-inefficiency 
inside the enterprises. On the other hand, since investment, production and distribution 
14 In China, the non-state sector not exactly means the private sector. The majority of non-state firms are 
collectively owned enterprises, which include urban and rural enterprises invested by collectives and some 
enterprises which used to be owned privately registered in industrial and commercial administration agency 
as collective units through raising fund socially. Most of them are usually influenced by local government 
in different degrees. Other non-state enterprises include individual enterprises, enterprises of joint 
ownership and share holding ownership. 
15 For detailed discussion of the relationship between the government and the state enterprises in China, 
see Lau 1993. 
21 
were just determined by the state plans, non-market allocation of capital, land, raw 
material, labor and output finally intensified the structural disequilibrium ofthe economy. 
As a result, economic growth was slowed down. 
To stimulate efficiency and develop a more competitive market environment, the 
Chinese government initiated enterprise reforms since 1979 and implemented 
comprehensive reform package in 1984. To give incentives for managers and workers in 
state enterprises, decision making powers were decentralized to enterprises. Various 
incentive schemes were introduced, allowing enterprises to share profits incrementally 
with the government. Bank loans had replaced government grants as the major sources of 
investment funds. At the same time, the control of factor markets was relaxed and the 
dual price system was introduced. Allowing enterprises to sell their above plan products 
at market prices in the open market. Over time, the share of within-plan production 
declined, enterprises faced market prices at the margin (Jefferson and Xu 1994). On the 
other hand, the establishment of non-state enterprises, such as collective enterprises, 
private enterprises and joint ventures, were also encouraged by the state in order to 
stimulate market competition. 
Although the series of reform has increased the profit incentive of managers and 
workers in state enterprises. And gradually transformed the economy from a centrally 
planned system to a market economy, some have argued that the productivity of state 
enterprises has not improved. Under the contracting system, the government has 
decentralized most of the authorities to enterprises. Yet a large proportion of the 
production materials are still under price control and are distributed through the planning 
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system. The accounting profits of most of the state enterprises do not reflect their 
operating performance. There are complaints that most of the state enterprises are still 
protected by the state under the policies of low interest rate, low exchange rate and low 
material price. Decentralization is not successful in hardening enterprise's budget 
constraints and cannot substantially reduce X-inefficiencies. In a survey of the state 
enterprise's managers of Wuhan city, most of the managers reply that the capital 
utilization ratio of their firms is only about 60-70%. It is believed that the ratio can 
increase at least 10% under normal operation. Although the official working hours of 
staffs in the enterprises are 8 hours per day, but their actual working hours mostly are 
only 4-6 hours. 
Also, under the contract responsibility system, the managers and workers can 
receive full marginal retum from fringe benefits but only a fraction of marginal retum 
from increase in production and sales. This creates incentives for them to divert efforts 
and capital away from production to fringe benefits and causes a decline in productivity. 
Compared with the state sector, the non-state sector, such as collective and private 
enterprises, receives less support but also less intervention from central governments^^. It 
is expected that they are more productive than state-owned enterprises. In addition, as the 
non-state sector grows and becomes larger in scale over time, they will compete directly 
with the state sector. As a result of competition, the productivity of the state sector may 
also improve. Hence, if provinces have larger output shares of non-state sector, market 
16 In 80's, the state-owned firm paid between 45% to 55% of its profit, while the collective firms paid only 
35% or less of its profit. Foreign invested firms paid only 15% tax if they were located in the coastal open 
cities orthe special economic zones(see Wei 1993). 
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forces may play an important role. Therefore, it is expected that the productivity level of 
the province will be higher. 
The share of government expenditure (SG) is treated as an index of degree of 
direct government intervention. The share of gross industrial output value by non-state 
enterprises in the total gross industrial output (SNS), is used as a proxy for the ownership 
structure of the p r o v i n c e s " and serves as an index of competitiveness. The lower is the 
share, the keener is market competition. 
2.3 Output structure: 
Neoclassical theory assumes the efficient allocation of resources over time. At any 
given moment, it is impossible to increase aggregate output by shifting factor inputs from 
one sector to another. However, maintaining equilibrium in the face of shifts in internal 
demands and in external trade requires high elasticities of substitution among both 
commodities and factors and rapid responses to market signals. In developing countries 
and planned economies, such conditions usually are not fulfilled. According to the 
structuralist view, there may be systematic variations in the returns to labor and capital in 
different uses. Implying a potential for accelerating growth by reducing bottlenecks and 
� I t seems more appropriate to use the share of output of non-state sector in the total social output as a 
index of ownership structure. However, only the data of the industrial sector is available, so we can only 
use the SNS as a proxy. Nevertheless, measuring in the terms of the share of total output, the industrial 
sector is the dominant one among the five material production sectors, in 1992，the share of industrial 
output in total social output is equal to 66.4 percent, so the ownership structure of industrial sector is a 
reasonable indicator of the ownership structure of the national economy. 
24 
reallocating resources to sectors with higher productivity. In the study of the 
productivities of 20 developing countries and 7 centrally planned economies, 
Chenery(1986) states that the agricultural sector has a relatively low productivity growth 
and factor retums compared with the manufacturing sector. Young (1994) also states that 
the productivity growth and factor retums are relatively low in the agriculture sector in 
the newly industrialized countries during the years of rapid growth. Treating the output 
share and labor share in the manufacturing sector as explanatory variables of economic 
growth in developing countries, Feder (1986) finds that both of them are positively 
related to economic growth. So it is argued that in the course of economic development, 
intersectoral transfers of input factors from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural 
sector will promote economic growth. The share of the agriculture sector in the provincial 
national income is included as an explanatory variable and is expected have a negative 
effect on productivity. 
2.4 Changes in Regional Development Strategy 
As a planned economy, the central government plays an important role in regional 
development. The development strategy of central planners directly affects the regional 
allocation of resources, and thus spatial economic growth. In the formulation of regional 
economic strategy, central planners face the tradeoff between efficiency and equity: 
should more resources be allocated to underdeveloped regions for ensuring 
interprovincial equity, or to advanced regions with higher productivity so as to promote 
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economic growth? In general, the year 1979 can be viewed as a benchmark for the change 
in regional development strategy of China. Before 1979, the regional development 
strategy emphasized to the build up of regional self-sufficiency and region equality. 
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Under strict central planning, funds from the coastal areas has first remitted to the state 
and then transferred to the interior. However, since 1979, the strategy was shifted to one 
which favors regional specialization. Economic authorities have been decentralized to 
local governments and enterprises in order to stimulate economic growth and 
productivity. And the development focus has been shifted from the interior to coastal 
region after reform. The changes of regional development not only affect region income 
distribution, but also have significant impacts on productivity growth. In what follows, 
we give a briefdescription of the regional development ofChina. 
Table 2.2 Regional distribution ofthe capital construction investment ( in percent) 
1953-57~~58^ 6^^ 6 ^ 7^75 7 ^ sT^ 8 ^ 9Tn~~ 
1 ¾ r^ m 1^ r^ r^ f ^ i^ ^ ^ 
Eastem 37 39 35 27 36 42 48 52 50 
Central 29 34 33 30 30 30 29 25 25 
Westem 19 22 26 35 25 20 17 16 17 
Non-region 15 5 6 8 9 8 6 7 8 
classified 
Sources: Zhao and Kwan (1995) Table 10 
18 For example, in the Third Five-Year Plan (1966-70) period, 90 percents of the fiscal revenue of 
Shanghai was remitted to the central government. For detailed discussion see Zhao and Kwan (1995). 
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2.4.1 Regional Development Strategy before 1979 
When the Communist Party came to power in 1949, the economic structure of 
China was extremely imbalanced. Over 70 percent of the industrial assets and outputs 
were concentrated in the coastal area. Within the coastal region, industrial production was 
again concentrated in a few cities. Eight cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenyang, 
Anshan, Benxi, Dalian and Fushun) made up 55 percent of the gross value of output of 
the coastal region (Yang 1990). To rectify the structural imbalance, the state concentrated 
its investment in the interior. In the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57)，the state concentrated 
its efforts on 694 industrial projects, among which 150 projects were built with Soviet 
help. All of them were oriented towards the development ofheavy industry. Although in 
his speech “On of Ten Major Relationships", Mao Zedong pointed to the importance of 
fully utilizing and strengthening the coast industrial bases as a prerequisite to build up 
large industrial bases in the interior. Actually 472 (68 percent) of the 694 industrial 
projects were to be located in the interior of the country, in contrast to only 222 in the 
coastal areas. 
From 1958 to 62, the Chinese government ushered in the Great Leap Forward 
movement, attempting to stimulate simultaneous development of large, medium, and 
small enterprises at the national and local levels. During the Great Leap Forward, the iron 
and steel industry was considered a focal point of the industrialization process. Under the 
mass campaigns for the production of iron and steel, a number of small and medium-
sized iron and steel works at the provincial and even at the county {xian) level were built 
up during the period. The objective of production localization caused the iron production 
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centers to move towards the west and south. During this period, the share of capital 
construction investment in the central and westem region increased from 48 to 56 
percent, and further increased to 59 percent in 63-65. 
From the 60's to the 70's, the China-Soviet relation deteriorated. The Vietnam 
War also damaged the China-U.S. relation. The Chinese government sensed that the 
threat of war was increasing and the state should prepare to defend the invasion by the 
superpowers. Thus the guiding principle of the development strategy in this period was to 
establish regionally self-sufficient, independent industrial systems, in order to avoid the 
industrial infrastructure being destroyed if there was an invasion. Under this military idea, 
over 29,000 entities, including 2,000 (one-third of the nation's total) major enterprises 
and research institutes, were relocated to the so-called third-front provinces (included 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Gansu and Shannxi) based on the principle of regional 
diversification^^. 
The accelerating development of inland industries was a result of political and 
military considerations rather than economic ones. The outcome was inevitably 
inefficient. According to Larsen(1992), the locations of third-front enterprises in 
mountains created serious economic problems. Despite large investment in capital 
construction, many enterprises never reached their full production capacity due to poor 
infrastructure, such as inconvenient transportation and shortage of water supplies. While 
reducing the risk of industrial facilities being destroyed by a war, the third-front 
development strategy discouraged regional specialization and cooperation. As a result, 
19 The principle of regional diversification implies that industrial production should scatter to isolated 
areas, such as mountainous area and caves, in order to avoid being destroyed by the enemies. 
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most of the third-front projects were unprofitable due to high production and 
transportation cost. For example, because of the poor infrastructure in the inland region, 
the investment per ton of steel amounted to 3000 RMB, whereas it was only 1000 RMB 
in the coastal region. The growth of output value per 100 RMB invested in the coastal 
• • 2 0 
region had for years been more than twice of that in the interior. 
To capture the impact of different regional policies on the productivity levels, 
time dummies of the period of the Great Leap Forward (D58) and the period of the 
Cultural Revolution (D65) will be treated as explanatory variables affecting the technical 
efficiency in our subsequent regression analysis. 
2.4.2 Regional Development Strategy since 1979 
In the late 70's, the problems induced by the interior-oriented development 
strategy became more serious. Sectoral imbalance, low production efficiency and low 
living standards of the population caused the planners to rethink the regional 
development strategy. In 1979, the central authority decided to reform the rigid centrally 
planned economy based on the principle of "enlivening the domestic economy and 
opening to the outside world". As a result, the regional development strategy was 
changed in favour of the coastal region. The main idea of the post 1979 regional strategy 
can be well explained by the "ladder-step theory". It argues that the eastern region is 
more advanced economically in terms of infrastructure, technical level, and educational 
20 For detailed discussion ,see Larsen (1992), Chapter 7. 
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level. So the state should develop this region first. Only after the eastem region has 
become sufficiently developed, the attention should then be tumed to the central region 
and eventually to the westem region. Under this development sequence, the coastal areas 
are to make use of their advantages in technology, research and management skills to 
adapt industrial production to new and high-quality products, and to increase exports of 
high value-added manufactory products to the outside world. On the other hand, the 
interior should focus on the production of energy, communication and raw materials to 
support economic development in the coastal area. It is expected that the advanced 
technology and capital of the eastem region will eventually spread to the interior region 
and the momentum of growth will trickle-down from the eastem region to central and 
westem region. Therefore, to stimulate the economic growth of the whole country, the 
state proposes the principle “let some people get rich first". Economic privileges were 
granted to the coastal areas. To attract foreign investment, four Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian (included Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) 
were established in 1979. In 1984, 14 coastal cities were declared open cities for foreign 
investment, which enjoyed preferential policies such as tax deduc t ion�� In 1988，Hainan 
province was established and became the largest SEZ in China. 
Table 2.2 shows that the share of capital investment in the eastem region increases 
from 42 percent in the period 1976-80 to 52 percent in the period 1986-90. Implying that 
the state has changed its development target from the interior to the coastal area. On the 
other hand, under the preferential investment policies, most of the foreign investment 
21 For detailed discussion of the special policies to foreign investment, see Hu (1991), Chapter 10. 
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flowed into the eastern region. From 1983 to 1993, the eastern region took about 90 
percent of the direct foreign investment in China, of which over 50 percent was in 
Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu. The central and westem regions picked up only 10 
percent of the direct foreign investment, (see Sun(1995),Table 1). 
In the reform period, the regional development strategy of the state has been 
switched from an interior-oriented one to a coastal oriented one. State investment and 
foreign direct investment are concentrated in the coastal region. At the same time, one 
important aspect of regional development in the reform era pertains to fiscal 
decentralization. To stimulate economic efficiency of local governments and enterprises, 
the central government has progressively decentralized its economic authorities since 
1979. As a result o f the fiscal decentralization, the growth of revenues accruing to the 
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central government becomes stagnant. In 1979, the share of government revenue in 
national income is equal to 31.9 percent. But in 1992, it drops to 17.6 percent, resulting in 
a chronic fiscal deficit in the reform era. From 1981 to 1992, the total fiscal deficit 
increased from 2.55 billion to 23.66 billion RMB.^^ The fiscal condition of the central 
government has been worsening. (The process of fiscal decentralization and the 
deterioration of regional redistribution, see Appendix 4). 
2.4.3 The Impacts ofDifferent Regional Strategies on Productivity Change 
In the above sections, we have discussed the different regional strategy ofthe pre-
reform and reform era. In the pre-reform era, to attain the balanced growth ofthe coastal 
22 The adjusted fiscal revenue is equal to the total fiscal revenue minus debt income. 
23 China Statistical Yearbook 1993，pp. 32, 215-218. 
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region and the interior, resources were transferred to poor provinces through the central 
planning system. Since the state emphasized regional self-reliance, most of the 
investment projects did not concem the economies of scale and the regional comparative 
advantage, especially during the Great Leap Forward and the period of Third-Front 
Construction. In the reform era, economic authorities were decentralized and regional 
specialization was being emphasized. Therefore, it is expected that the productivity 
growth would be faster in the reform era. In the subsequent empirical analysis, dummy 
variables capturing the impact of policies shifts on productivity growth will be added as 
explanatory variables. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework and Estimation Methods 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework for analyzing productivity changes will 
be laid down. It is clear that rapid economic growth does not imply an improvement in 
production efficiency. Therefore, in order to provide an overview of the regional 
productivity changes in China, we need to estimate the provincial production function. 
For a two-input model, a provincial production function may be specified as follows: 
Y,=Mt^zJf(K,,LJ . (3.1) 
where subscripts i and t denote the ith province and period t respectively; Y；^  is the 
national income ofthe ith province in year t, and K^ t and Ljt are the capital stock and labor 
force respectively. f(K,L) can be assumed in a specific functional form (such as Cobb-
Douglas function or translog flmction). A/t,zJ is the technical efficiency of the ith 
province, measuring the shifts in the production function. The term t represents time and 
z" is a vector of explanatory variables affecting efficiency. In this thesis, the vector z" 
includes all or a subset of the following variables: 
SG: the share of government expenditure in the provincial national output; 
SNS: the share of gross industrial output value of non-state enterprises in the 
total gross industrial output; 
SAGR:the share ofagricultural output in the provincial national income; 
D66: the time dummy of the period of 1966-69; 
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D79: the time dummy of the period of 1979-92; 
D84: the time dummy of the period of 1984-92; 
D89: the time dummy of the period of 1989-90; 
t: the time variable. 
The rationale for including these variables may be found in the previous chapter. 
SG and SAGR are assumed to be negatively related with technical efficiency, and SNS is 
negatively related to technical efficiency. The coefficient D66 captures the impact ofthe 
Cultural Revolution24. ^79 and D84 represent the change in productivity growth due to 
the rural and urban economic institutional reforms respectively. D89 shows the effect of 
retrenchment and readjustment policies in the period from 1989 to 1990. The coefficients 
D66 and D89 are expected to be negative, while D79 and D84 are expected to be positive. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the main problems in the estimation of 
provincial production functions is the lack of provincial capital stock data. Therefore, in 
following sections, we suggest three approaches to estimate the provincial production 
ftmctions: the conventional approach, the second approach replacing the variable of 
growth ofcapital stock by investment-output ratio and the third approach approximing of 
the production functions by Taylor expansion. In each case, the fixed-effects and random-
effects models commonly used in panel data analysis are estimated (see Hsiao, 1986). 
24 The time dummy covers the period of 1966 to 1969, rather than the whole period of the Cultural 
Revolution. The economic chaos lasted for the first three years of this period. The economy returned to 
normal path in 1970 (see Sun 1992). 
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3.1 Method I : The Conventional Approach 
The conventional method derives productivity changes by estimating equation 3.1 
alone using regression analysis. This framework requires data of the capital stock and the 
labor force. One difficult task of applying the above framework in the present context is 
to construct the capital stock series based on newly released statistical data. The 
estimation method of the capital stock series for the period 1979-92 is discussed in 
appendix 3. 
Using the capital stock data estimated in Appendix 3, national income (in 1952 
prices) and the labor force series (the figures being available in various issues of the 
provincial statistical yearbooks), we can estimate the aggregate production functions for 
different provinces. In this section, using the same approach as that in Jorgenson et al. 
/ ^ � 
(1987), the two-factor translog production function will be used to derive factor output 
elasticities. For a two-factor output model, the translog functional form is adopted: 
ln Yit = ln Ai + an ln Kjt + 0t2iln L；^  + cc3i(ln K-,f 
+ a4i(ln U f +0c5i (ln KiO(ln Lit) + i^t ； (3丄1) 
Ai = exp (Yoi + YiiT + 72^84 + Y3D89 + Y4SNSu + y5SGit+y6SAGRit). 
(3.1.2) 
25 We apply the translog production function first rather than Cobb-Douglas (CD) or Constant Elasticities 
ofSubstitution (CES) function because both CD and CES functions are assumed that the elasticity ofscale 
is fixed, but the translog function allows the elasticity of scale to change with output or factor proportions. 
Moreover the translog production function can be regarded as a Taylor expansion o fan arbitrary 
production function: y = f(x,, &，...,x„)，under some of the restrictions. 
For detailed derivation, see Heathfield and Wibe 1987’ pp. 105 -108. 
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In equations 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, t denotes the 产 observation and i denote the 产 
province. In equation 3.1.1, Y is the national income in 1952 constant prices, K 
represents the aggregate capital stock of the province and L represents the average 
number ofemployees in the accounting year. All a ' s are coefficients to be estimated. Sitis 
assumed to be a normal stochastic disturbance. 
In equation (3.1.2), Aj is regarded as the technical efficiency of the 产 province^^ 
We assume that technical efficiency depends on many factors, yoi captures the province-
specific effects on productivity. T is the time factor, so yji can be viewed as the rate of 
technological change ofthe i^ ^ province over time. We assume that both yoi and yn vary 
across provinces. D84 is a dummy variable which captures the global changes in the 
productivity induced by urban reforms and D84 equals zero for the years before 1984 and 
one in and after 1984. The year 1984 is selected because the comprehensive urban 
reforms were implemented in this year, and these reforms substantially lowered the 
ability of the central government to control national economic activities. On the other 
hand, the autonomy of local authorities and enterprises was strengthened. It is expected 
that the comprehensive reforms will have a substantial influence on the productivity of 
the economy. D89 is a dummy capturing the effects of r e t r e n c h m e n t - c u m - r e a d j u s t m e n t 
policies in 1989-1990. Its value equal to one in the years of 1989 and 1990 and zero in 
other years. SNS is the share of gross industrial output value by non-state enterprises in 
total gross industrial output, SG is the share of government expenditure in the provincial 
national income, SAGR is the share of agriculture output in the provincial national 
26 Since the capital stock series estimated in Appendix 3 only included the period 1978-92，the time 
dummies D66 and D79 are excluded from equation 3.1.2. 
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income. The technical change is assumed to be Hicks neutral, and thus does not influence 
the marginal rate of substitution between capital and labor. 
If the parameters 0c3i, 0t4i, 0t5i in equation 3.1,1 are jointly equal to zero, then the 
function will be reduced to the Cobb-Douglas form: 
ln Yit = ln Ai + an ln K；, + 0c2iln L^ + 8 .^ (3.1.3) 
Ai 二 exp (Yoi + YiiT + Y2D84 + y3D89 + Y4SNSu + y5SG + y6SAGR). (3.1.4) 
Ifthe sum ofocu and 0¾ in equation 3.1.3 is further tested to be equal to one, then 
the function will be restricted to exhibit constant retums to scale. The resulting function 
will be : 
ln (Yit / Lit) 二 ln Aj + a^ ln (Kit 丨 Lit) + ^it. (3丄5) 
The production functions will be estimated for the period 1979 to 1992. We only 
have data of 14 provinces. Since we have only 14 years of data for each province, the 
degrees of freedom are too small for the estimation of the production function of each 
province. Therefore the time-series and cross-section data are pooled together, and the 
production flinctions are estimated based on panel data analysis. Panel data analysis not 
only increases the degree offreedom, but also has several other advantages. For example, 
it reduces collinearity among explanatory variables and hence improves the efficiency of 
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estimation. Furthermore, it controls the effects of missing or unobserved variables, and 
increases consistency of the estimates (see Hsiao 1986). 
In general, the joint F-test should be applied to test the stability of the 
coefficients ofexplanatory variables, and to determine whether the provincial data should 
be pooled together. However, the short time series compels us to assume that these 
parameters are constant across provinces and over time periods. With the exceptions of 
intercept term Yoi and the coefficient of time yn, all the parameters are stable across 
provinces in equation 3.1.2. 
In this thesis, the fixed-effects model and random-effects model are applied to 
estimate the production function. The fixed-effects model assumes that the differences 
across provinces can be captured by the differences in the constant term y-,Q_ In other 
words, a dummy variable for each province is introduced. 
Instead of assuming that the yjo's are fixed coefficients, the random-effects model 
• 2 
assumes that they are independent random variables with a mean Yo and variance 5^ . It 
implies that the ith province is viewed as a random sample from some larger 
population(see Judge et al. 1988). 丫丨。may then be written as: 
Yio= Yo+^ i^； 
where the component i^j is the random disturbance characterizing the ith observation and 
2 2 
is assumed to be constant through time, with E(^i) =0 and E(^ ； ) 二 6^ . [i； is assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the random disturbance of the production function Sj. Since the 
covariance matrix for the random model is not the scalar-identity type (Judge et al. 1988), 
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generalized least squares estimation is applied to get the best linear unbiased estimator in 
the random-effects model. 
The major difference between the fixed-effects and random-effects models is that 
the former treats 丫丨。as fixed parameters while the latter treats them as a sample ofrandom 
drawings from the population. Hsiao (1986) states that using a fixed-effects specification 
could produce significantly different results from a random-effects specification, 
especially in cases where the length of the time series (T) is short but the number of 
observations 0^) in a given year is large. However, in the case where T approaches 
infinity for fixed N, the estimators of both two models would be identical. Hsiao(1986) 
argues that "the fixed-effects model is viewed as one in which investigators make 
inferences conditional on the effects that are in the sample. The random-effects model is 
viewed as one in which investigator make unconditional inferences which respect to the 
population of all effect"(see Hsiao pp.42). Therefore the fixed-effects model is likely to 
be appropriate ifour data set cannot be regarded as a random sample from the population. 
On the other hand, if our data set is a random sample from the population and we are 
interested in inference about the population, then the random-effect model may be more 
appropriated. 
Another possible way to determine the choice of model is to test the orthogonality 
of the random effects and the regressors. Mundlak (1978) criticizes the random-effects 
model because it neglects the correlation that may exist between the effects of y-,Q and 
other explanatory var iables.�？ If correlation does exist, the estimators of random-effects 
27 There are reasons to believe that in many circumstances Yw and the explanatory variables are correlated, 
particularly in the estimation using firm data. For detailed discussion, see Hsiao (1986)，pp. 43-44. 
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model will be biased but the estimators of fixed-effects model are not. Therefore, the 
Hausman test for misspecification should be applied to test the null hypothesis whether 
the correlation between 丫⑴ and other explanatory is zero. The null hypothesis suggests 
that both estimators of fixed-effects and random-effects models are consistent but those 
ofthe fixed-effects model are inefficient while the alternative hypothesis suggests that the 
estimators offixed-effects model are consistent but that of random-effects model is not. 
3.2 Method II: Replacing the Variable of the Growth of Capital Stock by 
Investment-Output Ratio 
In order to explore the sources of productivity growth, the production function has 
to be estimated first. However, the capital stock data series for the period 1952-1978 is 
not available, therefore the conventional approach discussed in Section 3.1 can only be 
applied to the study ofproductivity in reform period. In order to compare the productivity 
changes before and after reform, the method which is commonly used in many recent 
growth accounting studies (for example Tyler (1981), Ram(1987), Gregorio(1992) and 
Gemmell (1995)) is applied in our estimation. The production flmction is first assumed to 
be Cobb - Douglas: 
Y, = A,K,"L,P, (3.2.1) 
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Ai = exp (Yoi + Yiit + y2SGit + Y4SNSit+Y5SAGR + Y6D66 + y ,W9 ^gD84 
+ Y9D89). (3.2.2) 
In equation 3.2.1, t denotes the 产 period and i，the 产 province. Y is the national 
income in 1952 constant price; K and L represent the capital stock and average 
employment level respectively. In equation 3.2.2, Aj denotes the absolute efficiency level 
of the ith province, which is assumed to be a linear function of a group of specific 
variables, SG, SNS, SAGR, and fours time dummies, D66, D79, D84 and D89, which 
denote the periods of 1966-69，1979-92, 1984-92 and 1989-90 respectively. In our 
estimation, we exclude the period ofthe Great Leap Forward and the readjustment period i 
(1958 - 1965), because the data ofthis period has shown to be unreliable by most ofthe 
empirical studies (see Chen 1988a,Chow 1993). 
Taking logarithm on both sides of (3.2.1) gives: 
lnYit = lnAi + a lnKu + p lnLjt. (3.2.3) 
Differentiating the above equation with respect to time, we obtain the following equation: 
• • • • 
]L = A + a ^ + P ^ . (3.2.4) 
Yu 4 K“ L, 
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• • • • 
where — — ^ and — represent the growth rate of national income, absolute 
>；, ’ A, ’ K,, 4 
efficiency, capital stock and labor respectively. We let the net investment I be to K and 
reformulate equation 3.2.4 as: 
iL = A + a ^ ^ + P ^ (3.2.5) 
Y;, 4 K“ r" L, 
Because of the lack of reliable data on capital stock, we adopt the common practice of 
replacing K by I/Y (investment-output ratio). Then equation 3.2.5 can be reformulated as 
follows,28 
. • ‘ 
^ 二 & + 5 ^ + p ^ (3.2.6) 
y±t ^ i ^ i t ^it 
Y. 
where 6 equal toa ~ ^ . 
Ki, 
In equation 3.2.2, we assume that the technical efficiency Aj is a function of a 
group ofspecific variables. Taking logarithm on both sides of equation 3.2.2 gives: 
lnA, 二 yoi + hit + y,^G,, + y3W,, + yMGR,, + 调 6 + 调 9 + yjD84 
+ ysD89. (3.2.7) 
Differentiating equation 3.2.7 with respect to time, we get: 
28 Chenery(1986) follows the same practice ofreplacing K by / / r , w h i l e states that "it should be noted 
that the coefficient of investment term can be identified with the marginal productivity of capital only to 
extent that capital-output ratios are the same in all countries. Because this form of estimation does not rely 
on the assumption that factors are paid their marginal products, it gives some indication of the effects of 
this assumption". For detailed discussion, see Chenery(1986) and Hagen and Havrylyshyn (1969). We 
thank Dr. Hsueh Tien-tung for making us aware of Chenery's work. 
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A = 丫" + y^dSGi, + ^ sdSNSu + j4dSAGR, + ysd66 + #70 + ^jd79 
A 
+ jsd84 + ygd89 +ywd91.^^ (3.2.8) 
where d66, d70, d79, d84，d89 and d91 denote the time dummies for the years 1966, 
1970, 1979, 1984, 1989 and 1991 respectively. Coefficients d66 and d70 capture the 
impact of the Cultural Revolution, d66 is expected to be negative while d70 expected to 
be positive, implying that the productivity level dropped at the beginning ofthe Cultural 
Revolution, and then increased in 1970 when the national economy was recovered, d79 
and d84 represent the change of productivity growth due to the rural and urban economic 
institutional reforms respectively. Both are expected to be positive, d89 and d91 
correspond to the effect of retrenchment and readjustment policies in the period of 1989 
to 1990. The former is assumed to be negative and the latter is positive. 
Combining equation 3.2.6 and 3.2.8 into one equation, and adding a disturbance 
term i^jt, we have: 
• • • 
^ L � + s i L + p i + h ,； 
^ 4 Yi, 4 
A = y^ . + ^^dSGu + ysdSNSu + y4dSAGRi, + j^d66 + #70 + ^yd79 
為 
+ isd84 + ^ gd89 +ywd9L P- :• 9) 
29 D66, D79, D84 and D89 in equation 3.2.7 are dummy variables for the periods 1966-69, 1979-92, 1984-
92 and 1989-90 respectively. The value o f the dummy variable equals 1 for the years in the relevant period 
and equals zero for the other years. 
d66, d70, d79, d84, d89 and d91 in equation 3.2.8 are dummy variables for the years 1966’ 1970, 1979, 
1984，1989 and 1991. The value of the dummy variable equals 1 for the relevant year and equals zero for 
the other years. 
43 
3.2.1 Data Set 
The provincial data employed in this section are from the Compilation of 
Historical Statistical Materials on Provinces, Autonomous Regions and State-
administered Municipalities of the Whole Country, 1949-1989 (quangguo gesheng 
zizhiqu zhixiashi lishi tongji ziliao huibian, 1949-1989) and different provincial statistical 
yearbooks. The provincial output is the national income in 1952 prices. The employment 
data are mid-year figures in the accounting period. Net investment I is the productive 
accumulation (shengchanxing jilu) deflated by the price index estimated in Section 4.1, 
i.e. "means of production including increment of fixed assets (less depreciation) by 
material productions sectors and increment of working assets—” (China Statistical 
Yearbook 1994). Both government expenditure, gross industrial output value and 
agriculture output are measured in 1952 prices. Due to the limitation of data, only 20 
provinces in the period 1954-1992 are included in our study (included Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi，Gansu, Ningxia). 
To increase the degree of freedom in our estimation, we pool the provincial data 
together, assuming the coefficients (except the intercept terms) are stable across 
provinces. The fixed-effects and random-effects models are applied to our data set. The 
former assumes that the intercept terms yii in equation 3.2.9 varies across provinces and 
the latter assumes that y^  is random across provinces but with a constant mean. 
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3.3 Method III: Approximation of the Provincial Production Functions by 
Their Taylor Expansion 
The deficiency of the method applied in Section 3.2 in analyzing economic 
growth is the assumption ofconstant output-capital ratio. Under this restriction, marginal 
physical product of capital (which is equal to the estimated coefficient of investment-
output ratio (I/Y)) is assumed to be constant. This assumption may be unrealistic and may , 
underestimate the marginal physical product of capital (MPk) if the productivity growth 
(A) is positive and vice versa (holding the factor inputs constant).^^ On the other hand, it 
will underestimate the MPK if the law of diminishing marginal product holds and the 
3 1 
capital stock increases over time (holding the technical efficiency constant). 
Nevertheless, the capital stock data are not available in most of the countries, so this 
method is commonly used by economists in empirical studies of economic growth. 
Moreover, since only the first difference form of the production function can be estimated 
by the above method, we can only compare the growth of productivity rather than the 
absolute provincial productivity levels among the provinces. In view of these problems, 
we propose a new estimation method. Using the Taylor approximations ofthe provincial 
production ftmction, we can estimate the provincial production functions without 
30 It is because under the Cobb-Douglas specification, the marginal physical product ofcapital (MPK) is 
equal to a(Y/K).Y is equal to AK" L^，where Y, K, L and A are equal to output, capital, labor and technical 
efficiency respectively, a and p are the input elasticities of output. If the efficiency level is growing over 
time, then the YfK will gradually increase, holding the factor inputs constant. 
31 Under the Cobb-Douglas specification, the production function is assumed to ftilfill the law of 
diminishing marginal product. It is because MPK = a(Y/K), its first order derivative with respects to K is -
a(Y/K^) and negative in sign. It means that the increase of capital input will cause an decrease in the 
marginal physical product. 
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knowing initial capital stock data. It provides us with an alternative to studying the 
sources of productivity growth in China. 
3.3.1 Theoretical Framework: 
To investigate the provincial productivity levels, the production function approach 
is applied and the general production function in equation 3.1 is assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas: 
Y , = A , K - L l (3.3.1) 
Taking logarithm on both sides of (3.2.1) gives: 
ln r " = lnAit + a 贼 - , + p / ^ I , > (3.3.2) 
where i, t denote the number of observations and time respectively. Y, A, K，and L 
represent the national income, technical efficiency, capital stock and labor respectively; a 
and P are the output elasticities of inputs. 
In equation 3.3.2, the capital stock K；^  is equal to the initial capital stock (K^) in 
1952 plus the accumulated incremental capital stock (AKjt) from 1952 to t. 
K, == Z,. + AK, 
Equation 3.3.2 may then be rewritten as: 
ln Yu = lnAit + a ln(K, + Ai^,,j+p7^Z,, (3.3.3) 
let a ln(K. + A i ^ be the function ^(K^). Then the first-order Taylor's expansion 
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of cj>(.) around M^" is : 
32 Let f(x) be some function. Then the Taylor's expansion around x � i s : 
f ( x ) = f (xo) + f ( x o ) ( x - X o ) + R . 
where f(xo) is the first derivative off( . ) at x � a n d R is some remainder term (see Chiang 1984). 
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HKit) = H^K^t) + f ( A ^ " )(^it 一 ^it) + ^1 
= ^ (Ai:,.,)+f(A7^)(Z;.) + iei. 
Therefore: 
a ln(Ki + AK^J = a fln AK^J^ a * ^ ¾ ^ * K, ^R, (3.3.4) 
O^it 
Substituting into equation 3.3.3, we get: 
ln Yit = lnA, + a (ln M ^ + a * ^ ¾ ^ * 宅 +p/"A,+A/， 
oK, � 
=lnA, + a fln AK,J^ a * ^ * K. +^lnL,+Rj. 
AK,/ 
Ifi^; is small33, 
ln 7,, = lnAi + a fln AKJ+ a *yJ^-*K. +p/"A,. (3.3.5) 
AX// 
Rewriting equation 3.3.5, we get: 
lnY“ = M + afln A^,J + X . , 去 + ^lnL,t + Su ； (3.3.6) 
AX,_, 
where X； equals to a times Z " Note that in the original formulation (3.3.2), the effect of 
lnK on lnY is fully captured by the coefficient a , now the same effect is capitured by a 
33 This assumption may cause the inconsistency of the model, since under the first order Taylor expansion, 
R l = ^ : ^ ^ ) 2 + … + * " ; > � Z , . / + i ? " 
2 ！ “ • 
When 购 = l n (K,), 
Ri= —1 ,rZ,/+………+ , , : 、 , /果 / +凡 
2.YA^,/ ‘ n!(hKJ" 
therefore the R! converges to zero as AKi^  increases. Since there is no any better treatment, we simply 
assume that R^ is close to zero. 
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and X in (3.3.6). This is the result ofTaylor expansion: In (3.3.6)，a capitures the effect of 
lnAKit on lnY and X capitures the effect of deviation ofKjt from AKj^ 
lnA, 二 joi + Jjt + y2SG, + y4SNS, + y5SAGR, + j6D66 + yyD79+ 调 4 
+ ^gD89. 
In equation 3.3.6, AKjt is derived by summing up the net investment (¾, where: 
/ 
i . e . A ^ " = Y / , , . 
.=0 � 
The technical efficiency Aj is assumed to be a function of time, the share 
of government expenditure (SG), the share of output of the non-state enterprises(SNS), i 
the share of the agricultural output(SAGR) and four time dummy variables (D66, D79, 
i 
D84, D89) which have the same definitions as those in Section 3.2. j 
'( I 
I t 
3.3.2 The Data 
» 
Our estimation is based on the same data set from the Compilation of Historical : 
I 
Statistical Material of Provinces, Autonomous Regions and State-Administered ' 
Municipalities o f the Whole Country, 1949-1989 {Quanguo Gesheng Zizhequ Zhixiashi 
Lishi Tongji Ziliao Huihian, 1949-1989) and different provincial statistical yearbooks. 
The net investment I is defined as the provincial productive accumulation, which is 
deflated by the price index of accumulation in A3.1. Both the national income and net 
investment are in 1952 prices. 
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Due to the limitation of data , only 20 provinces for the period 1954-1992 are 
included in our analysis (included Beijing, Tianjin, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang， 
Shanghai, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia). The data of the period 1958-1965 is 
unreliable and will be excluded from our estimation. 
To increase the degree of freedom in our estimation, we pool the provincial data 
together, thus assuming that the coefficients (except Yoi and 入丨)are stable across 
provinces. The fixed-effects and random-effects models are applied to our data set. While ‘ 
丨； 
the former assumes that the intercept terms yoi in equation 3.3.6 is different across 
t 
provinces, the latter assumes that yoi is random across provinces but with a constant 
< 
mean. 丨 
Other than the fixed-effects and random-effects models, a third specification < 
I 
simply pools the provincial data together, but then assumes that the intercept term Yoi in ^ 
i 
equation 3.3.6 only varies across four regions i.e. the three municipalities (i.e. Beijing, 
Tianjin, and Shanghai taken together), the eastem, central and westem region. This 
specification differs from the fixed-effects model in that the intercept term not varies 
across provinces. Therefore lnAi in equation 3.3.6 may be written as: 
lnYu 二 lnAi + 响 ^it) + h〈去)+ 阿”+ ^ ； 
AA" 
lnAi = Joj DM +�2DE ^JosDC +y04DW + jjt + y2SG^, + y4SNSi, + y^SAGRi, + 
y^D66 + yyD79^ jsD84 + ygD89. (3.3.7) 
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where DM, DE, DC and DW are the regional dummies for the three municipalities, the 
eastern, central and westem region respectively. Such a specification assumes that the 







Chapter 4. Empirical Results of the Provincial Production Functions 
In this section, the estimated results of the regional productivity changes based on 
the different methods suggested in Chapter 3 are presented. 
4.1 Empirical Results of the Three Different Methods 
In this section, the regression results of the three methods are discussed. Table 
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 report the empirical results of the three approaches. We will first present 
� It, 
the basic results of the three approaches, and then compare them. � 
i 
I i�i H 




(i) Method I: Conventional Approach: 丨 
Table 4.1 presents the empirical results of the conventional approach. Since the |, 
i 
hypothesis that ay„ 0c4i and 0t5i in equation 1.1 are jointly zero cannot be rejected by the j 
5 
joint F-test, the production function reduces to the Cobb-Douglas form^^. We only report ； 
\^  
\ 
the regression results of the Cobb-Douglas production function for the random-effects ! 
model since its results are more reasonable^^ The F-statistics suggests that the functional ‘ 
form is the Cobb-Douglas form (i.e., a5, oc6 and 0c7 in equation 1.1 are zero). 
34 Based on the criterion ofMaximum ^^， i f the F-ratio<l,then the restricted model (Cobb-Douglas 
function in our case) is chosen. See Maddala (1992), pp.500. 
35 We only analyze the regression results of the random-effects model since it reports more reasonable 
results. The regression results of fixed-effects model is reported in the appendix. 
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Table 4.1 Regression Results ofthe Conventional Approach 
n ^ ^ 
Random-effects Random-effects 
Estimates t-ratios Estimates t-ratios 
T(HB) 0.037386 8 .17013~~0 .037612 8.21595 
T(SAX) 0.026691 6.75711 0.027227 6.91143 
T(IN) 0 . 0 3 2 1 4 6 7.94467 0.032242 7.93231 
T(LN) 0.032616 7.81818 0.031936 7.69140 
T(JL) 0.051349 12.2908 0.052358 12.6820 
T(JS) 0.052446 11.4470 0.052857 11.5619 
T(AH) 0.018719 3.62028 0.020599 4.16950 , 
T(FJ) 0 . 0 5 7 4 5 2 13.5882 0.058947 14.5002 丨: 
T(SD) 0.042277 8.79954 0.042394 8.80390 
T(HUB) 0 . 0 3 0 7 1 3 7.26594 0.032763 8.43813 
T(GD) 0.065107 14.1626 0.065686 14.3330 :': 
T(SCH) 0 . 0 3 0 4 1 5 7.46686 0.031161 7.72579 , 
T(GZ) 0.022022 5.09716 0.022857 5.31576 :, 
T(GS) 0.039188 10.0529 0.039149 10.0021 | 
D84 0.111423 8.23144 -0.109835 8.16366 !| 
D89 -0.027317 -2.65326 -0.028131 -2.74318 
LnK 0.687983 10.7016 0.711985 11.4304 
LnL 0.122210 1.75233 0.102474 1.48578 ) 
SG -0.231047 -1.86909 -0.192454 -1.95104 ； 
SNS 0.460422 3.46357 0.507818 3.97653 
SAGR -0.170412 -1.22232 
Intercept -0.609139 -1.45382 -0.670039 -1.59184 -
F-ratio* o T m ~ " ‘ 0.0520 ~ ~ ‘ 
Adjusted 0.9949 0.9950 
R -squared 
Hausman 49.884 49.356 
test (x') (d.f.=13) (d-f.=13) 
Notations: 
1. LnK, LnL stand for the coefficients oflogarithm of capital stock and labor. 
2. T( ) stands for the coefficient of time in different provinces. The parenthesis represents the provincial 
code of the coefficient.( See appendix 1) 
3. D1984 and D1989 stand for the coefficients of dummy variables of the year 1984 to 1992 and dummy 
variable of year 1989 and 1990.1. LnK, LnL stand for the coefficients of logarithm of capital stock and 
labor. 
4. SG, SNS and SAGR stand for the coefficient of the share of government expenditure, the share o fnon-
state share and the share of agricultural output, respectively. 
* Since both o f the F-ratio o f R l and R2 are less than one, all of the estimations are restricted to the Cobb-
Douglas function. 
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Table 4.1 reports that the estimates of the random-effects model are reasonable 
and significant. It shows that all provinces have positive and statistically significant 
exponential time trends. The coefficients of lnK and lnL are statistically significant and 
positive. 
When examining the sources of technological change, almost all of the 
coefficients have the expected signs. The positive sign of the coefficient ofD84 suggests 
that the urban economic reform has a positive effect on productivity. In fact, the year 
1984 can be seem as the watershed of the economic reform in China. From 1979 to 1984, 
the reform focused on the rural sector. To stimulate agriculture production, the central 
government implemented the household's responsibility contract system in the rural area, 
under which land was contracted to individual households. Households could make their 
own decisions in production after meeting their tax and quota sales obligations to the 
state36. In the urban area, the Chinese government experimented with management 
autonomy of enterprises. In June 1980, about 6600 enterprises were selected for the 
experiment (see Zhong 1990). In 1984，based on the good performance of the agricultural 
sector and the "experimental sites" in the urban area, the Chinese government shifted the 
focus of reform to the urban sector and started to pursue comprehensive institutional 
reforms in the urban area. For example, the dual-track price system was instituted under 
which enterprises were allowed to set the prices of products after fulfilling the state's 
planning targets. The decision-making power and the management of investment were 
36 For detailed discussion of the household contracting system, see Sicular (1992). 
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decentralized from the central authority to local governments. The inter-governmental 
fiscal relations were restructured and the contracting system of enterprises was 
strengthened. After the urban reform in 1984 and 1985, the ability of the central 
government to control the national economy was substantially weakened. At the same 
time, the local governments and enterprises gained substantial authorities in the decision 
making of production, investment and distribution. The direct control under the 
mandatory plan was greatly reduced and the market forces played a more important role 
. � 
in production and investment. These measures are expected to cause a jump in i 
productivity in 1984. i 
I 
The negative sign of D89 may be explained by the readjustment-cum-
I 
retrenchment policy of the central government to cool down the overheated economy. 
Although the decentralization policies implemented since 1984 stimulated faster 
economic growth, they resulted in increasing inflationary pressure, deteriorating 
structural imbalance and huge trade deficits. Overlooking the worsening economic 
environment, the Chinese authority declared its intention to liberalize price control in mid 
1988. The results were bank run, panic purchases, hoarding of materials and serious 
inflation (Hsueh and Woo 1991). In the fourth quarter of 1988, the Chinese authority 
announced the retrenchment policies to restore economic order. In order to control the 
aggregate demand, the state imposed drastic restrictions on credit and cut most of the 
basic construction investment projects. As a result, the market demand dropped 
dramatically. Many enterprises were forced to halt production or thus produced under 
capacity, leading to a decline in productivity. 
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With regard to R1 in Table 4.1, the coefficient of SG is negative and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting that the increase in government size 
has a negative impact on productivity. The coefficient of SNS is positive and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, implying that the growth of the non-state sector 
stimulates economic growth. Although the coefficient of SAGR has the expected sign, it 
is only statistically significant at 20%, implying that the change in the sectoral 
composition of the economy sector has no significant impact on productivity. Since the 
coefficient of SAGR is insignificant, we drop this variable from our equation, and the 
regression result is shown under R2 in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.2 Regression Results of the Method II 
R3 R4 R5 
Dependent~~~ Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Fixed-effects 
Variable 
~VY 0 0 5 ^ 0.05823 0.0584 
(1.921) (1.934) (1.981) 
dlnL 0.2981 0.3135 0.3132 
(1.780) (1.872) (1.882) 
dSNS -0.3240 -0.5984 -0.5982 
(-3.520) (-5.565) (-5.568) 
dSNSl 0.9792 0.9756 
(4.715) (4.730) 
dSAGR -0.8920 -0.8135 -0.8135 
(-8.883) (-8.131) (-8.138) , 
dSG -0.5414 -0.5261 -0.5284 
(-5.169) (-5.110) (-5.188) 
d66 -0.0885 -0.0819 -0.0820 
(-5.331) (-4.998) (-5.020) 
d70 0.0919 0.0944 0.0943 
(5.516) (5.767) (5.769) 
d79 -0.0051 0.0025 
(-0.352) (0.159) 
d84 0.0762 0.0589 0.0589 
(4.725) (3.621) (3.624) 
d89 -0.0208 -0.0265 -0.0266 
(-1.283) (-1.665) (-1.671) 
d92 0.0546 0.0364 0.0363 
(3.303) (2.179) (2.177) 
adjusted R " ~ ~ o 3 T 7 3 0.3410 0.3421 
Hausman 5.825 5.0775 5.1194 
test { x ) d . f .= l l d.f.=12 d.f .=ll 
Notations : (1) IA^ dlnL, dSNS, dSNSl, dSAGR, dSG stand for the investment-output ratio, the change of 
the share ofnon-state enterprises, the change o f t h e share of non-state enterprises(1979-1992), the change 
o f the share ofagricultural sector, the change of the share of government expenditure respectively. 
(2)d66, d70, d79, d84, d89 and d92 stand for the time dummy variables of the years of 1966’ 1970, 1979, 
1984，1989 and 1992 respectively. 
(3) the coefficient 692 is used rather than d91 is because the estimation result of d91 is insignificant, 
possible due to the time lag o f the policy effect of the ease ofretrenchment policy. 
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(ii) Method II: Replacing the Growth ofCapital Stock by Investment-Output Ratio 
Table 4.2 presents the regression results of the approach that replacing the 
variable ofgrowth of capital stock by investment-output ratio. Regression R3 shows that 
the coefficient ofI /Y is positive and significant at the 5 percent level for the fixed-effects 
model37. For p3, the coefficient ofI/Y, i.e. the the marginal physical product ofcapital, is 
equal to 0.0589^^ The coefficient of dlnL, the labor elasticity of output, is equal to 
0.2981. Both the coefficient of dSAGR and dSG have the expected signs and are , 
statistical significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of dSG is -0.5414, the result 
that government spending has a negative impact on economic growth is consistent with 
most of the empirical studies in developing countries (e.g. King and Rebelo 1990， 
Gregorio 1992). Government intervention in China thus worsens the productivity growth : 
ofthe region, rather than improving its competitive position. The coefficient of dSAGR is 
-0.892, implying that as the share of agriculture output in national income increases by 
one percent, economic growth will decrease by 0.89 percent. Therefore, structural 
changes may stimulate economic growth. It implies that the factor productivity in the 
non-agriculture sector is larger than the agriculture sector and intersectoral transfers of 
factor inputs such as labor may be a key to stimulating growth. 
In contrast with our prediction, the coefficient of dSNS in regression R3 is 
negative. However, in regression R4, when reformulate the regression equation, we find 
37 We only report the estimates o f the fixed-effects model since its provides more reasonable results. The 
estimates o f the random-effects model is reported in the appendix. 
38 The coefficient ofinvestment-output ratio (L^) is the marginal physical product of capital rather than the 
output elasticity. The capital elasticity ofoutput is equal to the marginal physical product ofcapital times 
the capital-output ratio (K7Y). 
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that there is a structural change in the coefficient of dSNS since the year 1979. With 
regard to R4 of Table 4.2, a variable dSNSl, which is equal to dSNS times the dummy 
variable D79 (D79 equals zero for the year before 1979 and one in and after 1979), is 
added to investigate whether there is a structural change in the values ofthe coefficient of 
dSNS before and after the period of reform. It shows that the coefficient of dSNS is -
0.5984, but the coefficient ofdSNSl is 0.9792. This means that before 1979, the growth 
ofthe share of the non-state sector has a negative impact on the economy, a one percent 
*k 
increase in the share of the non-state sector will cause a decrease of 0.60 percent in 
national income growth. However, since 1979, it becomes a factor stimulating economic 
k 
growth. A one percent increase in the share of the non-state sector will bring about 0.38 \ 
percent increase in national income growth (which equals 0.979 - 0.598). This result is , 
reasonable. The non-state sector consists of collective enterprises and private enterprises. : 
Prior to economic reform, collective enterprises typically were within the plan but were 
of a smaller scale than state enterprises. They were controlled by lower levels of 
government. They employed mainly local resources and supplied local markets. Owing to 
the inferior quality of indigenous resources, poor production techniques, small size and 
strict control by local governments, these small and collective-owned enterprises were 
less efficient than state enterprises. Also, private enterprises were very small in size and 
seriously restricted before 1978. They played a supplementary role to the state and 
collective sector (Hsueh and Woo 1991). It seems that market forces were not at work. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that an increase in the share of the non-state sector would 
cause a drop in productivity growth before 1979 . However, in the reform era, since the 
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non-state sector is less intervened by the state, the growing share of the non-state sector 
will have a positive effect on economic growth due to an increase in market competition. 
In R4, the coefficients ofd66 and d70 are equal to -0.0885 and 0.0919, implying a 
drop in productivity during the Cultural Revolution as compared with normal period. It 
shows that the unrealistic production targets and the mass political movement in the 
Cultural Revolution hampered the economic growth of China. On the other hand, the 
coefficient ofd79 is very small and insignificant, suggesting that the economic reform in 
1979 did not have a significant impact on the aggregate economy. It is because the reform : 
in 1979 only focused on the change in the ownership structure ofthe agricultural sector, 
- fe, 
參 N 
and its share in the aggregate economy was relatively small. In the industrial sector, only 
;i 
r 
some experiments on bonus scheme were implemented, so the impact of reform on the . 
^ 
aggregate economy may not be obvious. The coefficient of d84 is 0.0762 and is I 
I 
statistically significant. This implies that the comprehensive institutional reform 
i 
implemented in 1984 has a significant positive impact on productivity. On the other 
I 
hand, the negative sign ofthe coefficient of d89 shows that in the period ofretrenchment- : 
cum-readjustment, the productivity level dropped due to the underutilization of 
production capacity. 
Since the coefficient of d79 is insignificant, we drop this dummy variable from 
our equation, and the regression result is shown in R5 of Table 4.2. The result is very 
similar to that ofR2 but has a larger adjusted R-square. 
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(iii) Method III: Taylor Approximation ofthe Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Table 4.3 presents the empirical results based on the Taylor approximation ofthe 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Since the results ofboth the fixed-effects model and 
random-effects model are unsatisfactory, we re-specify equation 3.3.7 by replacing the 
provincial dummies (i.e. fixed-effects) by four regional dummies. In Table 4.3, the 
dummy DM captures the fixed effects of the three municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin，and � 
«1 
Shanghai; The other 3 regional dummies correspond to the fixed effects of the eastern, 
,_. 
39 
central and western regions. The results of the re-specified model are more satisfactory . “� 
.;n 
In Table 4.3, the result of the simple pooling model shows that capital and labor ？ 
) 
elasticities of output are 0.7577 and 0.1497 respectively. The coefficient 1/AK of a ！ 
specific province is equal to the capital input elasticity of output multiplied by the initial 丨 
1 
capital stock. With the exception ofthe negative or statistically insignificant coefficients i 
l/AK(bj) (Beijian) and l/AK(tj) (Tianjin), all of the others are positive and statistically : 
^ 
I 
significant. Among which, the coefficients of l/AK(ln) (Liaoning)，l/AK(hlj) 
(Heilongjiang), l/AK(sd) (Shandong), l/AK(hn) (Henan), l/AK(sc) (Sichuan) and 
l/AK(hun) (Hunan) are larger than the coefficients of other provinces. It means that these 
provinces have larger initial capital stocks in 1952. On the other hand, the coefficients of 
Guizhou and Ningxia are relatively small, representing relatively small initial capital 
stocks of those provinces (See Table 4.4). The results are consistent with the regional 
development of China in 1952. Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Henan were the 
39 The estimation results offixed-effects model and random-effects model are shown in appendix. 
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leading provinces, while Sichuan and Hunan were the provinces with large population 
size. In 1952 the national income levels of those six provinces were 3.74, 2.31, 4.09, 
3.32，3.67 and 2.52 billions RMB respectively, while the average of the 20 provinces was 
only 1.93 billions RMB. Since these provinces had larger economic sizes in 1952, it is 
expected that their initial capital stocks would be larger. On the other hand, both 
Guizhou, and Ningxia were less-developed provinces in 1952. Their national income 
were only 0.89, and 0.14 billions RMB in 1952, and therefore, their initial capital stocks 
were expected to be small. : 
The coefficients of SAGR, and SG are both negative and statistically significant, ：' 
implying that the structural change from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector and ;: 
i'i !'• 
the decrease in the local government intervention have positive impacts on the � 
！ 
productivity of the province. On the other hand, the coefficient of SNS is statistically [ 
I 
insignificant, and small. So it cannot be concluded that the increase in the share of the 
I 
non-state sector has a positive effect on productivity. The coefficient of d66 is negative • 
and statistically significant, suggesting that the productivity dropped in the period 1966- S 
»1 
1969，a period which is generally regarded as politically unstable. On the other hand, D79 ‘ 
and D84 are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that both the rural and urban 
economic reforms have improved the productivity of the aggregate economy. However, 
the coefficient ofD89 is statistically insignificant. 
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Table 4.3 Empirical Result of the Method III (Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
with Taylor Expansion Approximation) 
Simple pooling 
variable est. coeff. t-statistic 
DM 0.5615 3.997 
DE 0.3091 1.880 
DC 0.0771 1.476 
DW -0.0630 -0.381 
T -0.0384 -9.335 
lnAK 0.8988 22.958 
l/AK(bj)* -6.8382 -5.725 
l/AK(tj) 1.0963 1.267 
l/AK(sx) 6.6859 5.780 
l/AK(ln) 8.4766 1.699 
1/AKG1) 7.6333 6.014 
l/AK(hlj) 11.7779 4.786 � 
l/AK(sh) 5.4535 4.425 ‘ 
l/AK(g) 6.2031 8.033 �:, 
l/AK(sx) 7.6395 8.900 ； 
l/AK(sd) 16.1867 6.681 
l/AK(hen) 15.4805 7.896 ； 
l/AK(hub) 7.4589 7.118 ‘ 
l/AK(hun) 9.6607 12.301 i：' 
l/AK(gd) 8.2380 4.773 � 
l/AK(gx) 5.4371 5.350 1 
l/AK(sc) 16.8300 9.613 , 
l/AK(gz) 2.4300 9.153 ^ 
l/AK(shnx) 6.4849 6.714 j 
l/AK(gs) 6.2230 3.495 ‘ 
l/AK(nx) 1.4214 9.587 | 
hiL 0.0675 2.023 
SAGR -0.7695 -5.263 ‘ 
SNS 0.2078 0.883 i 
SG -2.0799 -9.721 \ 
D66 -2.2402 -8.559 , 
D79 0.1031 3.145 “ 
D84 0.2567 7.958 “ 
D89 -0.0038 0.109 
"Ad j^ t ed R ' 0.9687 
notations: . 
(1) DM, DE, DC, DW stand for the dummy variables of three municipalities, eastern region, central region 
and westem region of China respectively; 
(2) T represents the time variable; 
(3) D1966, D1979, D1984, D1989 represent the dummy variable of the period 1966-1969，1979-, 1984-， 
and 1989-1990. 
* the abbreviation (in brackets) is the identity code of the province; 
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Table 4.4 Initial Capital Stock in 1952 











Henan 17.22 � 
Hubei 8.298 ‘ 
Hunan 10.75 :丨 
Guangdong 9.162 , 
Guangxi 6.050 ； 
Sichuan l%.12 : 
Guizhou 2.704 | 
Shannxi 7.215 j^  
Gansu 6.624 
Ningxia 1.581 � 
Notation: * the value is assumed to be zero since the estimated value is 
statistically insignificant or negative. 





4.2 Comparison ofthe Estimation Results of the Three Different Methods 
In the previous sections ofthis chapter, we have discussed the empirical results of 
the three different methods adopted in estimating the provincial production functions. 
Generally speaking, some oftheir results are similar. These three models suggest that the 
urban reform in 1984 have a positive impact on the technical productivity. Both the 
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Method II (Replacing the variable of the growth of capital stock by investment-output 
ratio) and the Method III (Taylor approximation of production function) conclude that the 
political movement in the period of the Cultural Revolution hampered the productivity 
improvement. On the other hand, some ofthe results of the models are different. Firstly, 
with regard to the sources ofproductivity, although all of them show that the coefficients 
of SG are negative and the coefficients of SNS are positive, the coefficient of SNS in the 
method III is statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level. For all three approaches, the 
coefficients of SAGR are negative, but the coefficient estimated by conventional � 
N 
approach is statistically insignificant. It may be because the conventional approach only ：； 
includes the data of the reform era but the other two methods include the whole series ； 
s 
from 1953 to 1992. It is expected that the structural disequilibrium is more serious before ^ 
t < 
the reform era, so the coefficient of SAGR is significantly negative in the latter but not in , 
I 
the former. , 
I 
• I 
Secondly, the conventional approach and the method II show that the coefficients 
ofD89 are significantly negative, but the method III shows that it is insignificant. On the j 
other hand, the method II shows that the coefficient of D79 is significantly positive but it : 
I 
is not for the method III. 
Which method is to be selected? The method II and method III can estimate the 
productivity changes in both the pre-reform and reform era. However, both ofthem have 
some statistical problems. The method II assumes constant MPK, thus ignoring the impact 
of the changes in productivity level and the amount of capital stock on MPK. The 
assumption of constant MP�among different provinces is also unreliable in the case of 
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developing countries where the market systems are not well developed. Compared with 
the method II, the method III can estimate the initial capital stock of different provinces. 
However, it assumes that the reminder with respect to the first-order Taylor expansion 
series equals zero. Although the reminder converges to zero as the accumulated 
incremental investment increases (AK in equation 3.3.6) ,it may be very large in the early 
years. Therefore, this assumption may cause inconsistency of the estimation (see footnote 
33). 
Compared with the other two approaches, the conventional approach may be '' 
relatively reliable since it does not have the above statistical problems. However, the ：' 
estimation ofthe conventional approach requires the capital stock data. As mentioned in : 
'.• 
Chapter 2, we can only construct the provincial capital stock series for the period 1979- ) 
i 
92. To compare the provincial productivity changes in the pre-reform and reform period, ^ 
we can only rely on the estimation results of the other two approaches. On the other hand, ! 
I 
it should be noted that the estimation results using method III are based on the results of 
the simple pooling model rather than fixed-effects model (the random-effects model is | 
» 
rejected by the Hausman test). The results of those two models are rather different. The : 
simple pooling model shows a relatively large coefficient of lnAK but a relatively small 
one for lnL, while it is just the opposite for the fixed-effects model. The time trend ofthe 
simple pooling model is negative and statistically significant, but that in the fixed-effects 
model is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of SNS is statistically 
significant in the fixed-effects model but not in the simple pooling model (see appendix 
5). The simple pooling model gives a more satisfactory results than the fixed-effects 
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model in the estimation ofthe initial capital stocks. However, when we perform thejoint 
F-test, the simple pooling model is rejected at the 5 percent significant level,^^ implying 
that it may not be appropriate for estimating the production ftmction. It is difficult for us 
to determine whether the results of simple pooling model or the fixed effects model 
should be chosen. Since the method III has such a statistical problem, its results may be 
unreliable. 
Comparing with the method III，the conventional approach at least does not face 
the above statistical problems. Therefore the results of the conventional approach will be � 
i.i 
applied to compute the provincial productivity changes of China. Since the conventional :丨 
|| 
丨|i 
approach can only estimate the production function in the reform era，the results of the ： 
:, 








4.3 An Assessment ofProvincial Productivity Growth 
\ ’ 
The discussions above have dealt with the statistical significance and the expected ‘ 
signs ofthe estimated coefficients in explaining productivity changes. In this section, we 
will examine the regional productivity growth and compare the economic performance of 
the central planning system before 1979 and the decentralizing system since 1979. 
40 The joint F-test is to test the hypothesis that the intercept terms of different provinces are the same. If the 
hypothesis is not rejected, then the simple pooling model is chosen. The F-statistics in the result ofTaylor 
expansion approximation is 62.29 (d . f= 19,626),which rejects the null hypothesis. 
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Table 4.5 shows the average productivity growth rates of different provinces in 
the reform period based on the estimation results of the conventional approach. Following 
the standard practice, the average productivity growth rate is defined as the simple 
average of the annual growth rates of the national income minus the contributions of the 
factor inputs to economic growth: 
Table 4.5 Regional productivity growth (1979-92) 
1979-92 
G(Y) G(A)4i .�, 
HB 0.0799 0.0571 ; 
SX 0.0715 0.0427 . 
m M 0.0815 0.0430 
LN 0.0700 0.0446 丨 
JL 0.0891 0.0590 ‘ 
JS 0.1072 0.0774 ：’ 
AH 0.0808 0.0465 ‘ 
FJ 0.1182 0.0837 J 
SD 0.1043 0.0672 ‘ 
HUB 0.0782 0.0478 ’ 
GD 0.1241 0.0959 f 
SCH 0.0770 0.0474 i 
GZ 0.0810 0.0298 丨 
GS 0.0799 0.0453 ‘ 
Average 0.0890 0.0562 ‘ 
Notes: G(Y)= average growth rate of national income 
G(A)= contribution of productivity ‘ 
Source: Calculated based on Table 4.1 ‘ 
n 
Table 4.5 shows that the average productivity growth computed by the random-
effects model, the findings suggest that most of the coastal provinces (except Liaoning) 
exhibit good performance with respect to productivity improvement, with Guangdong, 
Fujian and Jiangsu having the highest productivity growth rates. However, Sichuan, 
41 The contribution of productivity are calculated based on the estimates of the random-effects model. We 
have also calculated the contribution ofproductivity based on the estimates of the fixed-effects model. 
Since the results o f the two models are similar, we only reports those of the random-effects model. 
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Guizhou, Gansu, (which belong to the western region), Inner Mongolia and Shanxi, 
(which belong to the central region) experienced lower productivity growth rates. When 
comparing with the national income growth rates of different provinces after reform, 
Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu have national income growth rates substantially above 
average in the period 1979- 1992. However, Sichuan, Gansu, Inter Mongolia and Shanxi 
have experienced average or below average growth rates in national income. Figure 4.1 
also show that there is a positive correlation between the national income growth rate and 
the productivity growth rate of provinces in the period from 1979 to 1992. This implies �; 
.,i 
that the faster economic growth in the coastal area is not only a result of an increase in ？ 
factor inputs, but also a substantial improvement in productivity. ； 
� 
I 
Figure 4.1 The Relationship between Growth of Productivity ‘ 
and Growth ofNational Income (1979-1992) ’ 
t 
0 . 1 ^ i I 
i 0 . 0 9 - - i 
碧 0.08 - 丄 • Q： mmmmmMmf^mmMMmw^Mmmsmim , 
^ 0 . 0 7 - • , 
1 0.06 - | _ _ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ )| 
0 0 . 0 5 - -
. ^ 0 . 0 4 . . 、 • 
•| 0 . 0 3 _ - • J 
1 0.02 --
£ 0.01 -, 
o J H- 1 H ~ ~ ~ ~ ' 
0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 1 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 4 
National Income Growth Rate 
Sources: Based on the result oftable 4.5 
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The better economic performances of Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu imply that 
openness and market competition are important factors in stimulating productivity 
growth. Since 1979, these provinces received a package of preferential policies from the 
central government, including favorable policies on taxation, foreign trade and 
investment. They were opened to foreign investment earlier than all other provinces: all 
special economic zones (except Hainan) were in Guangdong or Fujian. From 1979 to 
1992, the three provinces shared among themselves 50% of foreign direct investments in 
China (see Zhao and Kwan 1995). Besides, all of the three provinces enjoyed favorable � 
42 • M 
revenue-sharing arrangements with the central govemment^^ implying that local 'j 
. . i 
governments have higher economic autonomy. It is expected that their behavior is more : 
s I 
growth-oriented and profit-oriented than the central government. Moreover, the three , 
I. 
provinces have a larger collective sector than the other provinces. According to most of ,i 
t 
the empirical studies, the collective sector has a faster productivity growth than the state ； 
sector.(see Wu 1995, Jefferson 1992,1994 and Xiao 1992). Therefore, the higher 
•! 
productivity growth in these provinces are consistent with increasing competitive l| 
ii 
‘丨 
pressure, degree of openness to the international market, the more rational investment and j 
production decision making and less intervention from the central government. 
The conventional approach can only estimates the productivity growth rate in the 
reform era. To compare the productivity performance before and after reform, Table 4.6 
presents the average productivity growth rates of different provinces before and after the 
period of reform based on the results of the mehtod II. Comparing the productivity 
42. For detailed discussion ofdifferent kinds ofrevenue-sharing contracts, see Wong et al.(1995). 
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growth of the two periods, most of the provinces have better performance in the reform 
period: Only 5 provinces (Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Gansu and Ningxia) report 
slower productivity growth rates in the reform period. The first three are the old industrial 
centers of China, with higher productivity levels historically, and the last two are the 
relatively backward provinces. They all received relatively more resources from the state 
before 1979, but earned relatively less privilege in the reform period. In general, the 
economic liberalization and openness have stimulated productivity growth in most ofthe 
provinces in China, especially the coastal provinces which are granted preferential j 
,ii 













Table 4.6 Regional productivity growth (1954-92) 
1954-78 1979-92 
G(Y) G(A) G(Y) G(A) 
BJ 0.1115 0.0804 0.0821 0.0638 
TJ 0.0682 0.0478 0.0696 0.0489 
SX 0.0521 0.0250 0.0770 0.0447 
LN 0.0827 0.0647 0.0699 0.0471 
JL 0.0526 0.0300 0.0890 0.0504 
HLJ 0.0652 0.0410 0.0575 0.0319 
SHH 0.0757 0.0605 0.0758 0.0664 
FJ 0.0705 0.0503 0.1183 0.0881 
JX 0.0604 0.0407 0.0803 0.0575 
SD 0.0749 0.0550 0.1043 0.0754 
HEN 0.0712 0.0517 0.0879 0.0649 
HUB 0.0607 0.0297 0.0828 0.0567 
HUN 0.0688 0.0482 0.0696 0.0485 
GD 0.0548 0.0350 0.1240 0.0915 
GX 0.0599 0.0367 0.0821 0.0553 
SC 0.0649 0.0392 0.0764 0.0529 
GZ 0.0610 0.0274 0.0806 0.0495 
SHNX 0.0693 0.0445 0.0769 0.0505 
GS 0.0777 0.0495 0.0741 0.0485 
NX 0.0739 0.0373 0.0799 0.0359 
average 0.0688 0.0450 0.0829 0.0564 
Notes: G(Y)= average growth rate of national income 
G(A)= contribution of productivity 
Source: Calculated based on Table 4.2 
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Figure 4.2 Relationship between Productivity Growth and 
Economic Growth (1954-1978) 
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Figure 4.3 Relationship between Productivity Growth and 
Economic Growth (1979-1992) 
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Table 4.7 
Determinants of provincial growth performance since 1979 (average growth rate per year) 
G(Y) G(IA^) G(L) G(A) in which: 
G(SAGR) G(SG) G(SNS) 
BJ 0.0821 0.0089 0.0095 0.0638 0.0003 0.0034 0.0067 
TJ 0.0696 0.0141 0.0066 0.0489 0.0002 0.0022 0.0085 
SX 0.0770 0.0239 0.0084 0.0447 0.0051 0.0058 0.0045 
LN 0.0699 0.0104 0.0106 0.0471 0.0012 0.0005 0.0069 
JL 0.0890 0.0129 0.0148 0.0504 0.0033 0.0017 0.0025 
HLJ 0.0575 0.0160 0.0096 0.0319 0.0011 0.0024 0.0008 
SHH 0.0758 0.0074 0.0020 0.0664 0.0005 0.0000 0.0093 
FJ 0.1183 0.0143 0.0112 0.0881 0.0099 0.0045 0.0107 
JX 0.0803 0.0136 0.0092 0.0575 0.0069 0.0025 0.0049 
SD 0.1043 0.0170 0.0091 0.0754 0.0068 0.0029 0.0084 
HEN 0.0879 0.0124 0.0106 0.0649 0.0080 0.0030 0.0068 
HUB 0.0828 0.0191 0.0070 0.0567 0.0152 0.0038 0.0040 
HUN 0.0696 0.0133 0.0088 0.0485 0.0077 0.0024 0.0041 
GD 0.1240 0.0197 0.0093 0.0915 0.0081 0.0017 0.0090 
GX 0.0821 0.0166 0.0102 0.0553 0.0064 0.0062 0.0036 
SC 0.0764 0.0166 0.0089 0.0529 0.0066 0.0020 0.0063 
GZ 0.0806 0.0183 0.0116 0.0495 0.0062 0.0027 0.0014 
SHNX 0.0769 0.0159 0.0106 0.0505 0.0051 0.0035 0.0046 
GS 0.0741 0.0145 0.0111 0.0485 0.0028 0.0023 0.0040 
NX 0.0799 0.0269 0.0119 0.0359 0.0082 0.0121 0.0009 
average 0.0829 0.0156 0.0095 0.0564 0.0055 0.0032 0.0054 
Source: Calculation based on estimation result o f R 3 in table 4.2 
Note: G(Y) = real growth rate of national income 
G(irV), G(L), G(A) = contribution ofgrowth due to capital, labor and productivity respectively 
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To investigate the sources of productivity changes, the technical efficiency 
estimated by the method II is further decomposed into components associated with those 
factors affecting productivity. The estimation results are presented in table 4.7. In general, 
the coastal region has a larger efficiency growth, whereas the westem region and the old 
industrial centers (included Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang) have smaller efficiency 
growth rates. Among the provinces, Fujian and Guangdong have the highest efficiency 
growth, and Heilongjiang and Ningxia have the lowest. This result is also consistent with 
the findings of the conventional approach. 
The average productivity growth ofthe provinces is 5.56 percent and the average 
contributions of dSAGR, dSG, and dSNS are 0.55, 0.32 and 0.54 percent, respectively. 
Therefore, on average, these three factors make up 1.41 percent out of5.56 percent ofthe 
43 
productivity growth rate in the reform era. 
43nere la t ive ly"^ i i^^ i^^^ i^ i^ i^^o growth ofthese three factors implies that there are other factors such 
. . h , r r r a n i I l ^ves tmen t foreign trade volume and foreign investment ,affecting the productivity 
二二0〜=:二二1二 data are not available, we are not able to scrutinize these factors. 
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4.4 Regional Productivity Difference since 1979 
To compare the regional productivity differences after reform, the absolute 
efficiencies (A；) of the provinces are calculated based on the empirical results of the 
conventional approach. 
Applying the method of Schmidt and Sickle (1984) and Tsui et al. (1995)，we 
define the relative efficiency index for the ith province as: 
E- = A-JA, (4.1) 
where A* 二 maXi(A-,). 
In equation 4.1, Aj represents the absolute efficiency level o f the ith province, 
which is defined as the national income minus the contributions ofthe factor inputs. E； is 
the relative efficiency index. E； is equal to 1 when the ith province has the maximum 
efficiency; otherwise, it is less than 1. The estimation results of the absolute efficiency 
and relative efficiency are reported in Table 4.8a and Table 4.8b: 
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Table 4.8a: Absolute Efficiencies 
HB ^ ^ y ^ ^ J_^  ^ 
1979 0.575 0.397 0.624 0.947 0.453 0.676 0.493 
1980 0.583 0.371 0.598 1.001 0.465 0.694 0.498 
1981 0.578 0.376 0.625 0.947 0.476 0.741 0.534 
1982 0.621 0.436 0.722 0.966 0.498 0.797 0.562 
1983 0.676 0.473 0.741 1.064 0.607 0.883 0.580 
1984 0.758 0.556 0.808 1.205 0.666 1.019 0.668 
1985 0.837 0.576 0.871 1.313 0.698 1.144 0.744 
1986 0.860 0.580 0.854 1.384 0.725 1.226 0.778 
1987 0.927 0.578 0.881 1.487 0.825 1.314 0.796 
1988 1.010 0.602 0.957 1.594 0.907 1.451 0.812 
1989 1.016 0.612 0.953 1.580 0.844 1.394 0.814 
1990 1.034 0.627 0.982 1.528 0.866 1.421 0.814 
1991 1.099 0.632 1.031 1.552 0.881 1.487 0.753 
1992 1.209 0.693 1.091 1.691 0.977 1.849 0.903 
F J SD HUB GD SCH GZ GS 
1979 0.503 0 ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ^ 0 ^ o l ^ o ! ^ 0 ^ 
1980 0.560 0.781 0.554 0.422 0.615 0.552 0.635 
1981 0.630 0.820 0.589 0.450 0.615 0.540 0.546 
1982 0.657 0.861 0.621 0.478 0.652 0.586 0.577 
1983 0.669 0.927 0.634 0.487 0.688 0.635 0.641 
1984 0.754 1.053 0.744 0.545 0.763 0.719 0.701 
1985 0.861 1.106 0.837 0.624 0.844 0.736 0.777 
1986 0.887 1.153 0.850 0.664 0.868 0.757 0.845 
1987 0.958 1.299 0.893 0.750 0.922 0.795 0.879 
1988 1.064 1.415 0.926 0.850 0.966 0.806 0.951 
1989 1.115 1.402 0.913 0.875 0.953 0.794 1.003 
1990 1.144 1.415 0.912 0.934 0.960 0.790 1.026 
1991 1.264 1.532 0.930 1.074 1.001 0.834 1.058 
1992 1.493 1.746 1.024 1.285 1.098 0.855 1.126 
Source: Calculated based of the estimation results of the random-effects model in table 4.1 
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Table 4.8b : Relative Efficiencies: the random-effects model 
_HB ^ 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
1979 0.607 0.420 0.658 1.000 0.479 0.714 0.520 
1980 0.582 0.371 0.597 1.000 0.464 0.694 0.498 
1981 0.610 0.397 0.660 1.000 0.503 0.783 0.564 
1982 0.644 0.451 0.748 1.000 0.516 0.826 0.582 
1983 0.636 0.445 0.697 1.000 0.570 0.831 0.545 
1984 0.629 0.462 0.671 1.000 0.553 0.846 0.555 
1985 0.637 0.439 0.664 1.000 0.531 0.872 0.567 
1986 0.621 0.419 0.617 1.000 0.524 0.886 0.562 
1987 0.623 0.388 0.593 1.000 0.555 0.883 0.535 
1988 0.634 0.378 0.600 1.000 0.569 0.910 0.510 
1989 0.644 0.388 0.603 1.000 0.535 0.882 0.515 
1990 0.677 0.410 0.642 1.000 0.567 0.930 0.533 
1991 0.708 0.407 0.664 1.000 0.568 0.958 0.485 
1992 0.654 0.375 0.590 0.914 0.528 1.000 0.488 
FJ SD HUB GD SCR GZ GS 
1979 0.531 0.770 0.581 0.421 0.626 0.612 0.660 
1980 0.559 0.780 0.553 0.422 0.614 0.551 0.634 
1981 0.665 0.865 0.622 0.476 0.649 0.570 0.577 
1982 0.680 0.892 0.643 0.495 0.675 0.607 0.598 
1983 0.629 0.872 0.596 0.457 0.646 0.597 0.603 
1984 0.626 0.874 0.617 0.453 0.633 0.597 0.582 
1985 0.656 0.843 0.638 0.475 0.643 0.561 0.592 
1986 0.641 0.833 0.614 0.479 0.627 0.547 0.611 
1987 0.645 0.873 0.600 0.505 0.620 0.535 0.591 
1988 0.668 0.888 0.581 0.533 0.606 0.506 0.596 
1989 0.706 0.888 0.578 0.554 0.603 0.503 0.635 
1990 0.749 0.926 0.596 0.611 0.628 0.517 0.671 
1991 0.814 0.987 0.560 0.692 0.645 0.537 0.681 
1992 0.807 0.944 0.554 0.695 0.594 0.462 0.609 
Source: Calculated based on the estimation results of the random-effects model in Table 4.1 
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Our results reported in Table 4.8a suggest that Liaoning, Shandong and Jiangsu 
have the highest initial productive levels; all of them are the relatively advanced 
provinces in 1979. In terms of relative efficiency, we find that Liaoning, with a high 
concentration of heavy industries was the most efficient province in 1979-91. However, 
as mentioned in Section 4.3, Liaoning's productivity growth rate is one of the lowest 
since 1979. It shows that the gain from economic reform ofLiaoning is very modest. It is 
consistent with that the economic reform favours the coastal region the most. Since 
Liaoning was the most advanced area in the pre-reform era, Liaoning still enjoy a high 
absolute productivity level albeit little gain from reform^^. Nevertheless, Liaoning's 
leading position was replaced by Jiangsu and Shandong in 1992. Both of them are 
generally considered relatively advanced because of their long coast line with good ports 
and other favorable natural conditions. An interesting finding is that Guangdong and 
Fujian, which had a relatively low efficiency ranking in 1979, have improved their 
rankings very quickly in the reform period. The values of their relative efficiencies 
increased from 0.421 and 0.531 to 0.695 and 0.807 respectively. The lower productivity 
levels ofGuangdong and Fujian in 1979 are not unexpected. Although both ofthem were 
historically important foreign trading centers of China, the Chinese planners were 
unwilling to develop these provinces due to military and ideological considerations. This 
made Guangdong and Fujian relatively underdeveloped before 1979. Since 1979，thanks 
to economic reform and the open door policy, these two provinces become the area with 
44 We thank Dr. Hsueh Tien-tung for this point. 
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the fastest economic growth, and their productivity levels also converge to those of the 
advanced parts of China. 
On the other hand, we find that Shanxi has the lowest and decreasing relative 
efficiency level. Its relative efficiency was 0.420 in 1979 and decreased to 0.375 in 1992. 
Defining the relative efficiency gap as the difference between the highest and the lowest 
relative efficiency among the provinces, it finds that the relative efficiency gap increased 
increase from 0.580 to 0.625, implying a relatively large and increasing regional 
productivity gap. This result is different from Tsui et al.(1995), according to whom the 
regional productivity gap in China is surprisingly small. However, it does not follow that 
our result is inconsistent with that of Tsui et al.(1995). Our estimation is based on all 
sectors in the economy, while Tsui's estimation is based on the independent accounting 
industrial enterprises ofthe state sector. It is expected that the state sector suffers a higher 
degree of state intervention. Furthermore, advanced technology and skilled labor in the 
state enterprises may be transferred from the advanced region to the poor region through 
the central plan ofthe state. As a result, the allocative efficiency of the state enterprises is 
lower, and the regional productivity gap based on state sector data may be smaller. 
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Table 4.9 Coefficient of Variation ofProvincial Efficiency Levels 















Source: Based on the estimation result in Table 4.8b 
Figure 4.4 Coefficient ofVariation ofProductivity Level 
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80 
To study the convergence of regional productivity in the reform era, the 
coefficient of variation (i.e., the standard deviation divided by the mean) with respect to 
provincial relativive productivities in Table 4.8b is computed. Table 4.9 presents the 
coefficient of variation of provincial relative efficiency, it shows that the coefficient of 
variation drops during 1979-82 but increases during 1983-88, followed by a decrease in 
1989 when the retrenchment-cum-readjustment policy was implemented; then it starts to 
rise again. From 1979 to 1992, the coefficient of variation increases from 0.2462 to 
0.2903, implying a divergence of regional productivity. On the other hand, when the 
provinces are grouped into three regions (i.e. eastem, central and westem) the 
productivity difference between the three regions in our sample is widening in the period 
ofreform (see Table 4.10). In 1979，the average relative efficiency of the eastem, central 
and westem regions are 0.674, 0.532 and 0.633 respectively. In 1992, the average relative 
efficiency of the eastem region increases to 0.836, but those of the central and westem 
regions decrease to 0.501 and 0.555 respectively. It means that after reform, provinces in 
the eastem region generally have larger technological improvements than those of the 
other provinces. This result is consistent with most of the studies that the coastal area 
benefits more from reform and the open door policy. However, since only 14 provinces 
are included in the study, care must be exercised in concluding that the inter-regional 
productivity of China is widening after reform. 
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Table 4.10: Average relative efficiencies of the three regions 
1979 1984 1989 1992 
Eastem 0.674 0.737 0.779 0.836 
Central 0.532 0.571 0.524 0.501 
Westem 0.633 0.604 0.580 0.555 
Sources : Based on the estimation result in Table 4.8b. 
Chapter 5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to estimate the provincial productivity changes over 
time with the help of different estimation approaches and explain the sources of 
productivity changes. Some findings of this thesis are as follows: 
(1) Comparing the total factor productivity growth of the pre-reform and reform 
periods, most of the provinces have better performance in the reform period. Coastal 
provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu have the highest productivity growth 
rates, while the old-industrial center (e.g. Liaoning) and the interior (e.g. Sichuan, 
Guizhou) report the lowest growth rates. Besides, Both of the rural reform in 1979 and 
urban reform are found to have positive impacts on productivity. Our findings support the 
original conclusions of Chen et al.(1988), Lau and Brada(1990) and Chow(1993) that 
productivity growth in the reform era is impressive. 
(2) By decomposing the total factor productivity, it is clearly shown that 
government size, output structure and ownership structure have significant impacts on 
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productivity growth. The results suggest that a decrease in direct government 
intervention, an increase in the degree of competitiveness and the structural 
transformation may have positive effects on productivity. 
(3) In the pre-reform period, the old industrial centers which were strictly 
controlled by the central authority, such as Beijing, Liaoning and Shanghai, reported 
faster productivity growth. However, in the reform period productivity improvement in 
these provinces slows down while the other coastal new industrialized provinces where 
are granted preferential policies by the central government, such as Guangdong and 
Fujian, show better productivity performance. The higher productivity growth in the 
coastal area are consistent with increasing competitive pressure, higher degree of 
openness to the international market, the more rational investment and production 
decision making and less intervention from the central government. 
(4) Calculations ofrelative provincial efficiency indicate that: 
-The relative efficiency rankings ofGuangdong and Fujian improve very quickly 
in the reform period, implying that their productivity levels converge to those of the 
advanced areas in China. 
_ The productivity gap between the coastal area and the interior is large and 
increasing over time. Suggesting that the economic reform has created more favorable 
effects on the coastal area since preferential polices are granted to the coastal area. 
83 
- T h e coefficient of variation of provincial efficiency level is increasing in the 
reform period, implying that the provincial productivity levels diverge over time. 
These results suggests that although the economic reform stimulates faster 
productivity growth, the regional productivity disparity is widening. Such results may be 
due to the partial and incomplete reform which is more favorable to the coastal area, and 
regional protectionism which avoids market integration between advanced and poor 
regions, so market forces cannot work to equalize regional productivity. However, since 
our analysis is based on a data set less than 20 provinces, further studies based on more 
comprehensive data sets may be needed. 
84 
References: 
Agricultural Bureau, Xiangzhen Qiye Tongji Ziliao (Statistical Data o fRura l 
Enterprises) 1993. 
Barro, Robert J., "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries", The Quarterly 
Journal ofEconomics, May 1991, pp. 407 - 443. 
Barro, Robert J. and Sala-I-Martin, Xavier, Economic Growth, Singapore: McGraw-
Hill, 1995. 
Chen, Kuan et al, "Productivity Change in Chinese Industry: 1953-1985", Journal of 
Comparative Economics 12, 1988, pp. 570-591. 
Chen, Kuen et al, "New Estimates ofFixed Investment and Capital Stock for Chinese 
State Industo^", The China Quarterly, 1988, pp. 243 - 266. 
Chenery, Hollis, "Growth and Transformation", edited by Chenery Hollis et al., 
Industrialization and Growth, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, 
pp.13-36. 
Chiang, Alpha C., Fundamental Methods ofMathematical Economics, Singapore: 
McGraw-Hill, 1984. 
Chow, Gregory C.，“Capital Formation and Economic Growth in China", The Quarterly 
Journal ofEconomics Vol.CVIII, August 1993, pp.309 -342 . 
Chu, Ke-Young and Holzmann, Robert, “Public Expenditure: Policy Aspects", Edited by 
Vito Tanzi, Fiscal Polices in Economies in Transition, 1992, pp 254-267. 
Deng, Yingtou et al., Yusuanwai Zijin Fenxi (Analysis of China's Extra-budgetary 
Funds), Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe, 1991. 
85 
Dowrick, Steve, "Government Consumption: Its Effects on Productivity, Growth and 
Investment", The Growth of the Public Sector, edited by Gemmell Norman, 
London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd,1993,pp 136-154. 
Editorial Committee ofEconomic Administration in Contemporary China(ECEA), 
Economic Administration in Contemporary China, Beijing: Zhongguo 
Shehuikexue Chubanshe, 1985. 
Editorial Committee, ZhongguoXiangzhen Qiye Nianjian 1993, (China Rural 
Enterprise Almanac 1993), Beijing: Nongye Chubanshe, 1993. 
Editorial Committee, Zhongguo Jianzhuye Nianjian 92-93, (China Building Industry 
Almanac 92-93), Beijing: Zhongguo Jianzhu Gongye Chubanshe, 1994. 
Elias, Victor J., Sources of Growth: A Study of Seven Latin American Economies, 
San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992. 
Fan, Jinming, “ Relationship between Local Fiscal Balance and Regional Economic 
Development of the Republic China", A Selection of Studies on Mainland 
China's Economics, Taiwan: Central Academy ofEconomy, 1987. 
Feder, Gershon, "Growth in Semi-Industrial Countries: A Statistical Analysis", edited by 
Chenery Hollis et al., Industrialization and Growth, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986，pp. 263-282. 
Gregorio, Jose De, "Economic growth in Latin America", Journal ofDevelopment 
Economics 39 1992, pp. 59-84. 
Gemmell, Norman, “Endogenous Growth, the Solow Model and Human Capital”， 
Economics ofPlanning 28 1995, pp. 169-183. 
86 
Greene, William H., Econometric Analysis, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company 
1991. 
Grier, Kevin B., Tullock, Gordon, "An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic 
Growth, 1951-80" Journal ofMonetary Economics 24 1989, pp.259-276. 
Hagen, E.E. and Havrylyshyn, 0., "Analysis ofWorld Income and Growth", Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 18(10), 1969, pp.1-96. 
Heathfield, David F. and Wibe, Soren, An Introduction to Cost and Production 
Functions, London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1987. 
Hiroyuki, Kato, “Regional Development in the Reform Period", Edited by Ross, Gamaut 
and Liu Guogang, Economic Reform and Internationalization - China and the 
Pacific Region, St Leaonards: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 1992. 
Ho, Lok-sang, "Central-provincial Fiscal Relations", edited by Cheng,Yu-shek and 
Maurice, Brosseau, China Review 1993, The Chinese University ofHong 
Kong,1993.pp.l2.1-12.23. 
Hsiao, Cheng, Analysis ofPanel Data, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Hsueh, Tien-tung and Ouyang, Xiaoming, "Pattern of China's Public Expenditure and 
Revenue: An International Comparison", Studies on Economic Reforms and 
Development in the People's Republic ofChina, edited by Hsueh, Tien-tung et 
aL 1993, The Chinese University ofHong Kong, pp 43 - 62. 
Hsueh, Tien-tung and Woo, Tun-oy, The Economics of Industrial Development in the 
People's Republic ofChina, The Chinese University ofHong Kong, 1991. 
Hu, Qiu, Waishang Duiwa Touzi Tiaoyan Baogao (Survey Report of Foreign Direct 
Investment in China), Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe, 1992. 
87 
Jefferson, Gary H., “Potential Sources ofProductivity Growth within Chinese Industry", 
World Development 17, No.l, 1989 pp. 45 - 57. 
Jefferson, Gary H. et al, "Growth, Efficiency and Convergence in China's State and 
Collective Industry", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 40:2, 1992, 
pp.239-266. 
Jefferson, Gary H. and Xu Wenyi, "Assessing Gains in Efficient Production among 
China's Industrial Enterprises", Economic Development and Cultural Change 
42, July 1994, pp. 597 -615. 
Jorgenson D.W. et al., Productivity and U.S. Economic Growth, Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1987. 
Judge, George G. et aL, Introduction to the theory and practice ofeconometrics, 
second edition, Canada: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1988. 
King, Robert G. and Rebelo, Sergio, “Public Policy and Economic Growth: Development 
Neoclassical Implications", Journal ofPolitical Economy, Vol. 98, no5, 1990, 
sl26-150. 
Kwan, Yum K. and Chow, Gregory C, “Estimating Economic Effects ofPolitical 
Movements in China", working paper of the department ofeconomics, the HK 
University of Science and Technology, Nov. 1995. 
Landau, L. Daniel, "Government Expenditure and Economic Growth in the Developed 
Countries: 1952-76", Public Choice 47: 459-477, 1985. 
Larsen, Kjeld Allan, Regional Policy ofChina, 1949-85, Manila: Journal of 
Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1992. 
88 
Lau, Kam-Tim and Brada，JosefC., “Technological Progress and Technical Efficiency in 
Chinese Industrial Growth", China Economic Review, Vol l,No.2, 1990, 
pp.113-124. 
Lau, Pui-king, "Relations between Government and Enterprises", China Review 1993, 
edited by Cheng, Yu-shek and Maurice, Brosseau, Chinese University ofHong 
Kong, 1993,pp. 15.1-15.17. 
Liang, ping, Jiachang Yusuanwai Zijin Guanlei, Gaohao Zhonghe Caizheng Pingheng 
(Strengthening management ofextrabudgetary funds, improving fiscal balance), 
CaizhengJinyong (Public Finance and Finance), Sep 1989, pp. 35-41. 
Mody A. and F.Y.Wang, “Explaining Industrial Growth in Coastal China", The World 
Bank Discussion Paper, 1994. 
Mundlak, Y.,"On the Pooling ofTime Series and Cross Sectional Data”，Econometrica, 
46, 1978, pp.69-86. 
Office ofthe Census on the Tertiary Sector, Zhongguo Disanchanye Poucha Zilian 
(Statistical Data ofthe First Census on the Tertiary Sector ofChina), Beijing: 
Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1994. 
Perkins, Dwight Heald P., "Reforming China's Economic System", Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol. XXVI, June 1988，pp. 601 - 645. 
Perkins, Frances, Zheng ,Yuxin and Cao，Yong, “The Impact ofReform on Chinese 
Industrial Productivity", Productivity, Efficiency and Reform in China's 




Ram ,Rati, "Exports and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: Evidence from 
Time- Series and Cross-Section Data" Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 1987, pp. 51-72 . 
Schmidt, Peter and Sickle, Robin C, "Production Frontiers and Panel Data", Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics Vol 2 1984, pp. 347-374. 
Sicular, Terry, "China's Agricultural Policy During the Reform”，China's Economic 
Dilemmas in the 1990s, edited by the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of 
the United States, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992，pp. 240 -264. 
Singh, Inderjit and Xiao Geng, "Non-State Enterprises as the Engine of Growth --An 
Overview of China，s Industrial Output Growth at National and Provincial Levels 
1978-1990”，Working paper of the World Bank, 1992. 
State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, 1990-1995, Beijing: Zhongguo 
Tongji Chubanshe. 
State Statistical Bureau, Quangguo Gesheng Zizhiqu Zhixiashi Lishi Tongji Ziliao 
Huihian 1952-1989 ( A Compilation ofHistorical Statistical Materials of 
Provinces, Autonomous Regions ans State-Administered Municipalities of 
the Whole Country, 1949-1989), Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1990. 
State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Tongji Nianjian 1993 (Statistical 
Yearbook of Chinese Industry 1993), Beijian: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 
1993. 
State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo Nongcun Tongji Nianjian 1993 (Rural Statistical 
Yearbook of China 1993), Beijian: Zhongguo Tongji Chubenshe, 1993. 
90 
Sun, Haishun, “Foreign Investment and Regional Economic Development in China", 
working paper ofthe Department ofEconomics, The University of Queensland, 
1995. 
Sun, Jiang, Zhongwa Renmin GongheGuo Jingjishi (Economic History ofthe People's 
Republic ofChina), 1992. 
Tidrick, Gene, "Productivity Growth and Technological Change in Chinese Industry", 
World Bank StaffWorking Paper 761, 1986. 
Tsui, Kai-yuen，Rawski, Thomas and Hsueh, Tien-tung, “The Impact ofReform on 
China's State Industry - A Regional Perspective", Productivity, efficiency and 
reform in China's economy, 1995, Chinese University ofHong Kong, pp. 109 -
150. 
Tyler, William G., "Growth and Export Expansion in Developing Countries", Journal of 
Development Economics 9，1981, pp. 121 -130. 
Weiss, John, Economic Policy in Developing Countries, United States: Prentice Hall, 
1995. 
Wong, Christrine P.W., "Between Plan and Market: The Role of the Local Sector in Post-
Mao China", Journal ofComparative Economic 11, no.3, 1987, pp.385-398. 
Wong, Christrine P.W., "Central-Local Relations in an Era ofFiscal Decline: the Paradox 
of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China", The China Quarterly, Dec 1991. 
Wong, Christine P.W., "The Chines Economy in the 1990s: the End of the Road for 
Gradualist Reform?”，paper prepared for China Briefing 1993, Sep 1993. 
91 
I I 
Wong, Christine P.W., Heady, Christopher and Woo, Wing T., Fiscal Management and 
Economic Reform in the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press 1995. 
Woo, W.T. et al. "How Successful Has Chinese Enterprise Reform Been? Pitfall in 
Opposite Biases and Focus", Journal ofComparative Economics 18, 1994. 
pp.410-437. 
Wu, Yanrui, “Productivity Growth, Technological Progress, and Technical Efficiency 
Change in China : A Three-Sector Analysis", Journal ofComparative 
Economics 21,1995, pp.207 - 229. 
The World Bank, China: Long term issues and options, Washington, D.C., The World 
Bank, 1985. 
The World Bank, China: Revenue Mobilization and Tax Policy, Washington, D C., 
The World Bank, 1990. 
The World Bank, Privatization: The Lessons ofExperience, Washington, D.C., The 
World Bank, 1992. 
Xiao, Geng, “The Economic Role of Chinese Central and Local Governments: 
Challenges and Opportunities from the State and Non-State Industrial 
Enterprises", working paper of School of Economics and Finance, the University 
ofHong Kong, 1991. 
Yang, Dali, "Patterns of China, s Regional Development Strategy", The China Quarterly 
122:2, 1990, pp.230-257. 
Young, Alwyn, “The Tyranny ofNumbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the 
East Asian Growth Experience", NBER Working Paper, March 1994. 
92 
Zhao, Xiaobin and Kwan, Wing-kai, “China's Regional Development Models and Spatial 
Strategies", edited by Lee, S.M. et al., China's Social development (in Chinese), 
Hong Kong Commercial Press, 1995, pp.17-59. 
Zhong, Pengyong, Shinian Jingji Gaige (Economic Reform of the Ten Years), Henan 
Renmin Chubanshe, 1990. 
93 
Appendix 1: 





























Appendix 2 : Summary ofNotations 
t Time t 
i Province I 
Y National income in current price 
A Technological level 
K Capital stock 
L Average number of labor 
I Net investment 
T Time 
E Relative efficiency 
lnK Natural log o f K 
lnL Natural log o f L 
AK Accumulated incremental capital 
K Initial capital stock 
sk 1/AK 
DM Dummy variable of the three municipalities 
DE Dummy variable of the eastem region 
DC Dummy variable of the central region 
DW Dummy variable of the westem region 
D63 Dummy variable of the period of 1963-1965 
D66 Dummy variable of the period of 1966-1969 
D79 Dummy variable of the period of 1979-1992 
D84 Dummy variable of the period of 1984-1992 
D89 Dummy variable of the period of 1989-1990 
d66 Dummy variable of the yeajr 1966 
d70 Dummy variable of the year 1970 
d79 Dummy variable ofthe year 1979 
d84 Dummy variable of the year 1984 
d89 Dummy variable of the year 1989 
d92 Dummy variable of the year 1992 
SG Share of government expenditure in the provincial national income 
NI National income produced 
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NIU National income used 
SAGR Share of agriculture output in the provincial national income 
SNS Share of gross industrial output value by non-state enterprises in the 
gross industrial output value by state and non-state enterprises 
MPk marginal physical product of capital 
NVA Net value of fixed assets 
OVA Original value of fixed assets 
NVAIb Net value of fixed assets of industry below cun level 
OVAIb Original value of fixed asset of industry below cun level 
NVAI Net value of fixed assets of industry in cun level 
C 
OVAIb Original value of fixed asset of industry in cun level 
NVAAr Total NVA of rural households 
OVAAr Total OVA of rural households 
NVAA. NVA of collective agriculture enterprises 
C 
OVAA. OVA of collective agriculture enterprises 
C 
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Appendix 3: Estimates ofProvincial Capital Stock (1979 -1992) 
In this Appendix, we explain how we construct the capital stock series. It is 
important to explain first the nature of the data we used. China's national income is 
defined as “the sum of net output value of the five material production sectors of the 
economy, including agriculture, industry, transportation, construction, and commerce", 
excluding the net output in “non-material production sectors" which are mainly service 
sectors other than transportation and commerce. The national income is also known as the 
national income produced (guomin shouru) Q^l). (see China Statistical Yearbook 1993). 
Another measure of national income is national income used G^IU), which is defined as 
consumption plus accumulation (i.e., net investment). The difference between NIU and 
NI is “the difference between imports and exports (and between inflow and outflow for a 
region within the country)" plus statistical discrepancy. When net export is positive, NI is 
bigger thanNIU, and vice versa, (see China Statistical Yearbook 1994). 
In order to estimate the aggregate production function of national income, we will 
treat the summation of the capital stock of the five material production sectors as the 
aggregate capital stock ofthe economy. The process of estimating provincial capital stock 
series proceeds in three steps. Firstly, we estimate the initial values of the capital stocks 
ofdifferent provinces in 1979. Secondly we find out the series of net increments values of 
capital stock from 1979 to 1992. Finally, we added up the net increases in of the capital 
stocks over time, with the estimated initial values of capital stock, to form a capital stock 
series in different provinces. 
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A3.1 Initial value of capital stock 
National income is defined as the net material output from the five material 
production sectors. So the value ofcapital stock of different provinces in 1992 is derived 
by adding up the net value offixed assets G^VA) in the five material sectors. The NVA is 
defined as the original value of fixed assets (OVA) less depreciation, where OVA is the 
"original value of all fixed assets, calculated at the cost at the time of purchase, 
installation, reconstruction, expansion, and technical updating and transformation of the 
said asset...."(China Statistical Yearbook 1994). 
a) Industrial sector: 
The net value offixed asset OSTVA) ofthe industrial sector in 1992 can be found in 
Statistical Yearbook ofChina's Industry 1993, but it only covers the industrial enterprises 
at the township level {xiangf^ and above. The NVA below township level can be found 
in Statistical Material of Rural Enterprises (1992), which covers the data ofNVA at the 
village level {cun), and covers the data of original value of fixed asset (OVA) below cun 
\. 
level. Therefore, industrial enterprises below the cun level is assumed to have the same 
depreciation ratio as the village level, so the NVA below the cun level is estimated as 
follows: 
45 Industrial enterprises in China are managed by different administrative levels of the governments, based 
on its production scale and the sources of funding. In general, the enterprises of xiang and above xiang 




b ^ ^ I 
NVAIbi = OVAIbi * NVAI。丨 / OVAI。丨； 
where NVAIbi is NVA ofindustry below the cun level in province i; 
NVAI ,i is NVA of industry at the cun level in province i; 
The NVA of industrial sector is equal to the NVA at the county and above plus 
NVA at the cun level plus NVA below cun level. 
b) Construction sector: 
The net value of fixed asset of construction sector can be found in Yearbook of 
China's Construction 1993. 
c) Agriculture sector: 
The NVA ofthe agriculture sector is equal to the total NVA of rural households 
plus NVA of rural agriculture enterprises. The NVA of rural agriculture enterprises can 
be found in Statistical Data of Rural Enterprises (1992). The total OVA of rural 
households is equal to the number of households in the province times OVA for 
production per rural household. 
The data of OVA ofproduction per rural household at the provincial level can be 
found in the Statistical Yearbook ofChina 1993. However we cannot find the net value of 
fixed assets in this sector, so the total NVA of rural households is assumed to have the 
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same depreciation ratio as NVA of collective agriculture enterprises and is estimated as 
follows: 
NVAAn = OVAA ,丨 * (NVAA,i / OVAAJ ； 
where NVAA^ is the total NVA of rural households, and 
NVAAci is the NVA of collective agriculture enterprises. 
d) Commercial and Transportation sector: 
The capital stock data in these two sectors are based on the newly released data of 
the First Census on the Tertiary Sector of China. In the past, we can only find the 
provincial data of OVA of state enterprises for the two sectors. But in 1995, China 
published a complete data set which covers the data of both state, collective, and private 
enterprises, and thus provides new information about the capital stock ofthe two sectors 
at the provincial level. 
The NVA of the two sectors can be found in the Statistical Materials of the First 
Census on the Tertiary Sector of China of different provinces. The Census divides the 
statistical data into three categories, namely, enterprises, institutions and administrative 
organizations, and individual business {getihu). The NVA of the two sectors is only 
available in the categories ofthe enterprise units, and the institutions and administrative 
organizations. For individual business, we only have the data of OVA rather than NVA. 
Therefore, we assume that the NVA of individual business has the same depreciation rate 
as enterprises units. 
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A3.2 Net increase of capital stock 
In Section 4.111，we have defined National Income Used Q^IU) as consumption 
plus accumulation, with the latter referring “newly increased fixed assets (less 
depreciation) and working assets of material production sectors and non-material 
production sectors during a certain period of time". We will treat accumulation of fixed 
assets as the net increase of capital stock. 
Provincial statistical yearbooks provide annual data of accumulation of fixed 
assets. We need to separate the increase in fixed assets of material production sector from 
that in non-material production sectors. We assume that the share of productive 
construction in total investment in fixed assets is equal to the share of accumulation of 
material production sector in total accumulation of fixed asset. Productive construction is 
defined as “the construction directly used in material production, which includes 
investment in the five material production sectors". Since the data of total investment in 
fixed assets is only available after reform, we can only estimate the capital stock from 
1979 to 1992. The data of total investment in fixed assets in different provinces can be 
found in various issues ofChina Statistical Book and provincial statistical yearbooks. 
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A3.3 Estimating the annual series of capital stock 
After deriving the provincial initial capital stock in 1992 and the net increase in 
capital stock, we still have two problems. The first one is that the net increase in capital 
stock is measured in nominal terms. We have to fmd an appropriate price deflator to 
estimate the real value of net investment. The second problem is that the value of fixed 
assets ofthe five productive sectors, which is equal to the sum of cost paid at the time of 
investment. So the initial capital stock is also in nominal term rather than in real term. In 
order to solve the above problems, we applied Chow's (1993) method to estimate the 
price deflator of investment. 
As mentioned above, the national income used is defined as consumption plus 
accumulation, and we treat accumulation of fixed asset as the net increase in capital 
stock. In order to estimate the real value of capital stock, we need to fmd the price 
deflator for accumulation. However only the index of real national income and real 
consumption are available in published materials, and the indices of real national income 
used and real accumulation are still not available. In order to estimate the implicit price 
deflator of accumulation, Chow(1993) assumes that the national income and national 
income used the same price deflator, and he used the implicit price deflator for national 
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income46 to estimate real national income used in 1952 prices. Then the series of real 
accumulation in 1952 prices is derived by subtracting consumption in 1952 prices from 
the series of real national income. And the price deflator is estimated by dividing the 
current accumulation with the real accumulation. 
Due to the unavailability of data, we cannot estimate the price deflator of each 
province, so we apply the national price deflator in Chow (1993) and extend it from 1988 
to 1992. The price deflator is showed in table A3.1. It shows that from 1952 to 1982，the 
price deflator is not far from unity except in the years 1960 -1963 which is far below 
unity. Chow(1993) explains that this may be due to an overestimation of the real 
accumulation during these years ofeconomic collapse. So we assume that the price index 
of accumulation remains constant before 1983. Therefore the series of net increase in 
capital stock will be deflated only after 1983. 
Table A3.1 Estimated Price Index for Accumulation 
~ ^ Estimated price of year Estimated price of 
accumulation accumulation 
1 ^ L ^ r ^ 0 ^ 
1953 1.056 1974 0.941 
1954 1.027 1975 0.912 
1955 0.981 1976 0.877 
1956 0.912 1977 0.901 
1957 0.852 1976 0.948 
1958 0.906 1979 0.961 
1959 0.942 1980 0.946 
1960 0.839 1981 0.922 
46 The implicit price deflator for national income is equal to the national income in current value divided by 
the national income in constant value, while the national income in constant value is calculated by the 
index ofreal national income times the national income in 1952. 
103 
i:%i ^ n ^ ^ 
1962 0.497 1983 0.921 
1963 0.791 1984 1.034 
1964 0.921 1985 1.198 
1965 1.138 1986 1.222 
1966 1.047 1987 1.327 
1967 1.029 1988 1.437 
1968 1.098 1989 1.508 
1969 0.966 1990 1.063 
1970 0.937 1991 1.801 
1971 0.957 1992 1.932 
1972 0.936 
Sources : Table III o fChow (1993) and China Statistical Yearbook 1994. 
Since the price level ofnet investment before 1979 is constant, we assume that the 
book value of capital stock is equal to the real value of capital stock in 1979. The book 
value ofinitial capital stock in 1979 is calculated by dividing the capital stock in 1992 by 
the series ofnet increase in capital stock in nominal value in 1980-1992. Then we sum up 
the initial capital stock in 1979 with the net increase in capital stock in real value in 1980-
1992 to form the provincial capital stock series in order to estimate the production 
fimction.47 Due to data limitation, we can only estimate the capital stock of 14 provinces, 
namely, Hebei, Shanxi, Inter Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, 
Shandong, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichun, Guizhou and Gansu. 
The provincial data other than capital stock for our empirical analysis can be 
found in A Compilation of Historical Statistical Materials on Provinces, Autonomous 
47 The estimated data set ofcapital stock is available on request. 
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Regions and State-Administered Municipalities of the Whole Country, 1949-1989 and 
various issues ofprovincial statistical yearbooks published by the State Statistical Bureau 
(SSB).48 
48 The sources o f the provincial data are available on request. 
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Appendix 4: The Process ofFiscal Decentralization and Deterioration of 
Regional Redistribution since 1979 
A4.1 The process of fiscal decentralization 
The problem of the central-local fiscal system since 1979 is its regressive nature. 
The faster was the economic growth of a region, the less would be its remittances to the 
central government. Besides, some provinces have been given preferential treatments. 
Although Guangdong and Fujian have the fastest economic growth in the reform period, 
their remittances to the central government are smalP. Furthermore, local governments 
expect that increasing their revenue collection efforts will invite the imposition of high 
quotas of remittances in the future regardless of contractual terms. Therefore, local 
authorities in many areas aie collecting taxes only up to the contracted quota. After that, 
they offer tax reductions and exemptions to retain revenues in the enterprises. They can 
later tap these revenues to finance local government expenditures. ^^  The result of all 
these is a drastic decline in the share of fiscal revenue in national income and the 
worsening of the fiscal condition of the central government. Table A4.1 shows that from 
1979 to 1991, while the central government faces 12 deficit years, the local governments 
only face four deficit years. The magnitudes of the local government deficits are 
relatively small compared with those of the central government. The fiscal reform has 
49 From 1985 to 1987，Guangdong was contracted to remit only 0.778 billion RMB to the central 
government per year, while Fujian was received 0.235 billion RMB from the central government per year. 
From 1988 to 1990, Fujian was still received 0.05 billion RMB from the central government per year, 
while Guangdong was contracted to remit 1.639 billion RMB in 1988, but only increased to 1.722 billion 
RMB in 1990. see Wong et al, Table 3.1. 
50 See Wong(1993), pp.l4. 
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decentralized the fiscal revenue to the local governments, without simultaneously 
increasing the local expenditure responsibilities. The central government faces a decline 
in revenue inflows but still shoulders a large portion of public expenditure. 
Table A4.1 Budget Balance ofthe Central and Local Governments 
unit: 100 mill RMB 
~ Y ^ Total Cental Local 
1 ^ ^ V 7 ^ -133.33 -37.34 
1980 -127.50 -145.50 +18.00 
1981 -25.51 -11.87 -13.64 
1982 -29.34 -46.28 +16.94 
1983 -43.46 -83.96 +40.50 
1984 -44.54 -30.00 -14.54 
1985 +21.62 +0.83 +20.79 
1986 -70.55 -94.19 +23.63 
1987 -79.59 -96.78 +17.19 
1988 -78.55 -106.51 +27.96 
1989 -92.33 -109.86 +17.53 
1990 -139.65 -107.97 -31.68 
1991 -202.67 -182.54 -20.13 
Source: China Fiscal Statistics 1950-1991, pp.321 
The result of fiscal decentralization is the increasing economic authorities of the 
local government and enterprises. The most obvious evidence is the drastic expansion of 
extra-budgetary funds^\ From 1979 to 1992，the extra-budgetary funds increased from 
45.29 to 345.49 billion RMB. The ratio of extrabudgetary funds to fiscal revenue also 
51 The extrabudgetary funds refers to funds not arranged by government budget but self-raised and used by 
various localities, sectors, enterprises, institutions and administrative organizations according to relevant 
regulations. See China Statistical Yearbook 1994，pp.227. 
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increased from 42.2 percent to 110.6 percent. More fiscal resources are thus decentralized 
to local government and enterprises. 
Table A4.2 Government Budgetary and Extra-budgetary Revenue 
year (1) extrabudgetary (2)fiscal revenue ( l ) / ( 2 ) (%) 
funds (100 mill (adjusted)* 
RMB) 
T ^ 4 ^ “~~1068.0 4 l 4 
1980 557.4 1037.2 53.7 
1981 601.1 1011.5 59.4 
1982 802.7 1016.5 79.0 
1983 967.7 1169.6 82.7 
1984 1188.5 1434.6 82.4 
1985 1530.0 1776.6 86.1 
1986 1737.3 2122.1 81.9 
1987 2028.8 2203.0 92.1 
1988 2270.0 2370.2 97.5 
1989 2658.0 2644.9 100.5 
1990 2708.7 2937.1 92.0 
1991 3243.2 3149.5 103.0 
1992 3854.9 3483.4 H ^ 
*adjusted fiscal revenue equals to official fiscal revenue minus debt income. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1994, pp.213,216,220. 
Apparently, government intervention of the decision making of enterprises has 
been reduced as a result of economic reform. With the rapid growth of extra-budgetary 
funds, the investment authorities of the enterprises should be expanding simultaneously. 
In 1992，the share ofextra-budgetary funds held by state-owned enterprises and agencies 
was 74.7 percent and the share ofthe non-profit and administrative units was 23 percent. 
Local governments controlled only 2.3 percent (China Statistical Yearbook 1994, 
pp.221). It shows that most of the extra-budgetary funds are held by enterprises. 
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However, based on the current administrative system, it is argued that most ofthe flinds 
are in fact controlled by local governments (Dong et al. 1991). 
Firstly, according to the current administrative system, the non-profit and 
administrative units at the provincial or subprovincial levels are managed by the 
corresponding local governments. Therefore, their extrabudgetary ftmds are also under 
the control oflocal governments.^^ Secondly, as shown above, local governments tend to 
offer tax reduction and exemption to enterprises to retain fund in enterprises. Later 
recollect the funds through various off-budget fees and expenses {tanpai). Table A4.3 
presents the nominal and actual retained profit ratio of state industrial enterprises. It 
shows that the actual retained profit ratio is far lower than that of the nominal ratio. 
Implying that a large amount of profit was informally remitted to local government in 
80's. According to a survey in Hunan province, the total amount of various "off-budget" 
fees and expenses charged to enterprises were 12 percent of their total profit on average. 
Each enterprise was required to remit 59,000 RMB to the local government" Besides, 
since 1984, the central government gradually decentralizes investment authorities to local 
government. After 1988, investment projects below 5 million dollars are required to be 
approved by local governments only. So most of the investment decisions of enterprises 
now are controlled by local governments. 
52 For detailed discussion see Deng (1991)，pp.26-27. 
53 See Liang(1989), pp.35-41. 
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Table A4.3 Nominal and Actual Retained Profit Ratio of Independent Accounting 
Enterprises in the State Industrial Sector 
unit:100 mill RMB 
n ^ H 9 ^ ‘ 1986 
retained profit retained ratio retained profit retained ratio retained profit retained ratio 
(%) ^ ^ 
( A ) n o m i n a l ~ " ^ 1：9 3L6 1 ^ ^ “ ^ ^ 
(B)actual 146.5 18.6 177.8 18.8 151.3 17.2 
(A) - (B) 102.4 13.0 124.3 13.2 137.3 15.7 
sources: Deng (1991), pp.56. 
A4.2 The deterioration ofRegional Redistribution 
One of the by-products of fiscal decentralization is the weakening of the central 
authority's control over regional income redistribution. In the pre-reform era, to attain a 
balanced growth of the interior and coastal regions, the central government transferred 
economic resources from the economically advanced regions to the poor regions. Fiscal 
revenues of advanced regions were remitted to the central government, subsidies are 
transferred to poor region to support economic development. Therefore, it is expected that 
the higher the per capita income ofthe province, relatively more of the fiscal revenues are 
collected and relatively less the fiscal expenditure are spent there. The difference 
between the local government revenues and expenditures can be viewed as the fiscal 
transfer of the region. To examine such a relationship, we construct the following cross-
section regression equations: 
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Ln (R/N)i = ao + a； LnfV/N), + s, ’ (1) 
Ln (E/N), = po + P/ L n O m i + ^/， ( 2 ) 
i = 1 to 27provinces^^. 
where R/Nj, E/Nj and Y/Nj represent local fiscal revenue per capita, local fiscal 
expenditure per capita and national income per capita of the ith province respectively, s! is 
the random disturbance, oci and pi are the income elasticity of fiscal revenue and income 
elasticity offiscal expenditure respectively. The larger is the value ofcci, the larger is the 
proportion of tax received from rich provinces. In contrast, the lower is the value of Pi, 
the lesser is the proportion offiscal expenditure spent on poor provinces (Fan 1987). Just 
like progressive taxation and "regressive expenditure", if there is redistrution, the slope of 
taxes w.r.t. income exceeds 1 and the slope of expenditure w.r.t. income is smaller than 1. 
Therefore, if the central authority redistributes income between different provinces, oq 
would be larger than 1 and the p^  would be less than 1. Implying that a part ofthe fiscal 
revenue in advanced regions is transferred to poor regions by the central government in 
the form of fiscal expenditure.^^ Empirical results of Equation (1) and (2) are shown in 
Table A4.4 and Table A4.5: 
54 Due to data limitations, Qinghai, Tibet and Hainan are excluded from our estimation. 
k Y 
55 oti = dln(R)/dln(Y), i f a , > 1，then — > - ； 
R Y 
E Y 
p 1 = dln(E)/dln(Y), if P i < 1，then — < - ； 
E Y . 
where r, e, y equal to per capita fiscal revenue, per capita fiscal expenditure and per capita national income 
respectively. 
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Table A4.4 Estimation Results ofIncome Elasticities ofFiscal Revenue 
Dependent variable: ln (R/N) 
^ ^ ^ M R5 K6 ^ ^ ^ 
period 53-57 58-62 63-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 1991 
-^^;^i i^ m i 3： ^ 3 J 7 2 T ^ 5 T I ^ = ^ -5-888 -4.184 3 ： ^ 0 ~ 
ao (-2.807) (-7.288) (-8.197) (-9.054) (-8.758) (-11.12) (-10.00) (-6.829) (-3.414) 
ln(Y/N) 1 010 1.306 1.442 1.576 1.751 1.676 1.638 1.325 1.173 
ai (7.706) (17.483) (16.220) (16.217) (15.313) (20.025) (17.554) (15.096) (9.253) 
Adj.R2 0.692 0.921 0.910 0.910 0.900 0.939 0.922 0.897 0.765 
Notations: ( l)both the values ofdependent variable and independent variable are computed in the average 
value of the relevant period. 
(2)figures in the parenthesizes are the t-statistics. 
(3)all o f t he results are estimated by the OLS method. 
(4) R i to R9 are the results ofcross-section regressions based on provincial data in different periods. 
Sources: Compilation ofHistorical Statistical Material on Provinces o fChina (1949-1989), 
China Statistical Yearbook 1991，1992, 1993， 
China Finance Statistics (1950-1991). 
Table A4.5 Estimation Results ofIncome Elasticities ofFiscal Expenditure 
Dependent variable: ln(E/N) 
m m ^ ~~M R5 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
period 53-57 58-62 63-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 1991 
constant T ^ K m =^44 丽 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ ~ 
(Po) (-2.901) (0.794) (-2.275) (0.139) (-0.536) (-0.143) (-0.081) (-0.142) (-0.301) 
lnC^7N) 0 869 0.653 0.662 0.622 0.754 0.720 0.713 0.764 0.795 
(Pi) (7.558) (7.307) (6.522) (5.942) (7.134) (6.106) (4.883) (5.724) (6.215) 
Adj.R2 0.683 0.668 0.615 0.569 0.657 0.583 0.468 0.550 0.591 
Notations: ( l)both the values of dependent variable and independent variable are computed in the average 
value of the relevant period. 
(2)figures in the parenthesizes are the t-statistics. 
(3)all of the results are estimated by the OLS method. 
(4) R1 to R9 are the results of cross-section regressions based on provincial data of different periods. 
Sources: Same as Table 2,7. 
Tables A4.4 and A4.5 show that in all of the periods, oci is larger than 1 and Pi is 
less than 1. This finding implies that the central government plays an important role in 
redistributing income among different provinces. From the period 53-57 to the period 66-
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70, oti increases from 1.01 to 1.576. At the same time, pi drops from 0.869 to 0.622. One 
may infer that more and more resources are transferred from rich provinces to poor 
provinces since the fiscal burden of rich provinces and the public spending of poor 
provinces are increasing simultaneously^^ This result is consistent with the self-reliance 
regional development strategy of this period when more and more investment projects 
were concentrated in the interior, especially in the third-line provinces. 
On the other hand, from the period 81-85 to the year 1991, cq drops from 1.638 to 
1.173, and p! increase from 0.713 to 0.795. The central authority's ability to redistribute 
has been weakened in the reform period since less fiscal revenue is extracted from rich 
provinces and less fiscal expenditure is spent in poor provinces. Due to the preferential 
policies granted to coastal areas and the fiscal decentralization, more and more resources 
remained in the advanced coastal areas. 
56 For example, oti and P! are 1.576 and 0.622 respectively in the period of 66-70，i.e. a 1 percent increase 
in national income per capita o f the province, leads to a 1.576 percent increase of i t s fiscal revenue but 
only 0.622 percent increase in fiscal expenditure. 
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Appendix 5: Estimation Results of the Three Different Methods 
Table A5.1 Regression Results of the Method I (Conventional Approach) 
P M 
F b ^ Random fij^~‘ Random 
effects effects effects effects 
Estimates t-ratios —Estimates t-ratios Estimates t-ratios Estimates t-ratios 
- j ^ ) 0 . 0 4 2 0 3 2 ~ ~ 0 1 4 4 7 0.037386 ^ 7 ^ 3 0.040911 4.11406 0.037612 8.21595 
T(SAX) 0.032880 2.77929 0.026691 6.75711 0.031489 2.72875 0.027227 6.91143 
T(IN) 0.037116 2.50183 0.032146 7.94467 0.035105 2.44463 0.032242 7.93231 
T(LN) 0.034717 3.28748 0.032616 7.81818 0.033034 3.27106 0.031936 7.69140 
T(JL) 0.060594 5.98747 0.051349 12.2908 0.059959 5.97550 0.052358 12.6820 
T(JS) 0.055854 4.56631 0.052446 11.4470 0.054377 4.56330 0.052857 11.5619 
T(AH) 0.024828 1.78363 0.018719 3.62028 0.023877 1.73205 0.020599 4.16950 
T(FJ) 0.064424 4.80544 0.057452 13.5882 0.063318 4.78579 0.058947 14.5002 
T(SD) 0.045762 3.07773 0.042277 8.79954 0.043754 3.03940 0.042394 8.80390 
T(HUB) 0.035435 3.08295 0.030713 7.26594 0.034778 3.04841 0.032763 8.43813 
T(GD) 0.071546 6.09082 0.065107 14.1626 0.070258 6.11328 0.065686 14.3330 
T(SCH) 0.035011 3.10579 0.030415 7.46686 0.033820 3.06204 0.031161 7.72579 
T(GZ) 0.029404 1.57081 0.022022 5.09716 0.027047 1.48635 0.022857 5.31576 
T(GS) 0.044419 3.36694 0.039188 10.0529 0.042543 3.34207 0.039149 10.0021 
0 8 4 0.110032 7.93344 0.111423 8.23144 0.108908 7.95378 -0.109835 8.16366 
D89 -0.029098 -2.76498 -0.027317 -2.65326 -0.029812 -2.86022 -0.028131 -2.74318 
LnK 0.684185 2.47661 0.687983 10.7016 0.737219 2.84820 0.711985 11.4304 
LnL -0.045392 -0.32839 0.122210 1.75233 -0.051836 -0.37714 0.102474 1.48578 
SG -0.190917 -1.82592 -0.231047 -1.86909 -0.171903 -1.91711 -0.192454 -1.95104 
SNS 0.533938 3.79672 0.460422 3.46357 0.558564 4.19218 0.507818 3.97653 
SAGR -0.86158 -0.55806 -0.170412 -1.22232 
Intercept -0.609139 -1.45382 -0.670039 -1.59184 
F-ratio* O m 5 o T m 0.3201 0.0520 
Adjusted 0.9961 0.9949 0.9962 0.9950 
R -squared 
Hausman 49.884 49.356 
test (x') (d.f.=13) [ L (d-f,=13) 
Notations: 
1. LnK, LnL stand for the coefficients oflogarithm of capital stock and labor. 
2. T( ) stands for the coefficient of time in different provinces. The parenthesis represents the provincial 
code of the coefficient.( See appendix 1) 
3. D1984 and D1989 stand for the coefficients of dummy variables of the year 1984 to 1992 and dummy 
variable ofyear 1989 and 1990. LnK, LnL stand for the coefficients of logarithm of capital stock and labor. 
4. SG, SNS and SAGR stand for the coefficient of the share of government expenditure, the share of non-
state share and the share of agricultural output, respectively. 
* Since both o f the F-ratio o f R l and R2 are less than one, all of the estimations are restricted to the Cobb-
Douglas function. 
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Table A5.2 Regression Results ofthe Method II 
R3 R4 R5 “ 
Dependent~~ Fixed- Random- Fixed- Random- Fixed- Random-
Variable effects effects effects effects effects effects 
1 7 V o T ^ O m ^ 0.05823 0.0189 0.0584 0.0190 
(1.921) (0.660) (1.934) (0.782) (1.981) (0.787) 
dlnL 0.2981 0.2524 0.3135 0.2725 0.3132 0.2719 
(1.780) (1.545) (1.872) (1.703) (1-882) (1.699) 
dSNS -0 3240 -0.2924 -0.5984 -0.5790 -0.5982 -0.5786 
(-3.520) (-3.321) (-5.565) (-5.633) (-5.568) (-5.629) 
dSNSl 0.9792 1.0311 0.9756 1.0259 
(4.715) (5.174) (4.730) (5.177) 
dSAGR -0.8920 -0.9086 -0.8135 -0.8222 -0.8135 -0.8222 
(-8.883) (-9.922) (-8.131) (-8.493) (-8.138) (-8.493) 
dSG -0 5414 -0.5236 -0.5261 -0.5078 -0.5284 -0.5112 
(-5.169) (-5.150) (-5.110) (-5.088) (-5.188) (-5.172) 
d66 -0.0885 -0.0909 -0.0819 -0.0837 -0.0820 -0.0838 
(-5.331) (-5.621) (-4.998) (-5.253) (-5.020) (-5.274) 
d70 0 0919 0.0961 0.0944 0.0985 0.0943 0.0984 
(5.516) (5.950) (5.767) (6.211) (5.769) (6.207) 
d79 -0.0051 -0.0052 0.0025 0.0037 
(-0.352) (-0.314) (0.159) (0.239) 
d84 0.0762 0.0754 0.0589 0.0571 0.0589 0.0571 
(4.725) (4.799) (3.621) (3.609) (3.624) (3.609) 
d89 -0.0208 -0.0183 -0.0265 -0.0246 -0.0266 -0.0247 
(-1.283) (-1.163) (-1.665) (-1.587) (-1.671) (-1.594) 
d92 0 0546 0.0548 0.0364 0.0355 0.0363 0.0354 
(3.303) (3.404) (2.179) (2.184) (2.177) (3.438) 
intercept 0.0506 0.0456 0.0458 
(5.513) (5.125) (5.155) 
adjusted R ^ " " " O M 7 3 0 3 ^ O 4 l 0 0.3309 0.3421 0.3320 
Hausman 5.825 5.0775 5.1194 
test (x ' ) d . f . = l l d.f.=12 d . f .=l l 
Notations : (1) VY, dlnL, dSNS, dSNSl , dSAGR, dSG stand for the investment-output ratio, the change of 
the share ofnon-state enterprises, the change o f t h e share of non-state enterprises(1979-1992), the change 
o f t he share ofagricultural sector, the change of the share of government expenditure respectively. 
(2)d66, d70, d79, d84, d89 and d92 stand for the time dummy variables of the years of 1966, 1970，1979, 
1984, 1989 and 1992 respectively. 
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Table A5.3 Empirical Result ofthe Method III (Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
with Taylor Expansion Approximation) 
Simple “ fixed-effects random-effects 
pooling 
variable est. coeff. t-statistic est.coeff. t-statistic est. coeff. t-statistic 
DM 0.5615 3.997 -0.0766 -0.276 
DE 0.3091 1.880 -0.9356 -2.870 
DC 0.0771 1.476 -1.0412 -3.288 
DW -0.0630 -0.381 -1-3576 "4-517 
T -0.0384 -9.335 0.0197 3.548 0.0037 0.922 
lnAK 0.8988 22.958 0.1691 3.620 0.3045 7.472 
l/AK(bj)* -6.8382 -5.725 -11.0840 -14.062 -10.066 -13.216 
l/AK(tj) 1.0963 1.267 -1.2494 -2.209 -0.4984 -0.926 
l/AK(sx) 6.6859 5.780 2.7688 3.468 3.6791 4.677 
l/AK(ln) 8.4766 1.699 -2.3654 -0.884 -0.8294 -0.311 
l/AK01) 7.6333 6.014 1.8111 2.112 2.9555 3.673 
l/AK(hlj) 11.7779 4.786 2.8152 1.697 5.4674 3.413 
l/AK(sh) 5.4535 4.425 -6.3326 -6.937 -4.7769 -5.449 
l/AK(f]) 6.2031 8.033 -0.2410 -4.457 0.5685 1.104 
l/AK(sx) 7.6395 8.900 1.3779 2.274 2.4215 4.165 
l/AK(sd) 16.1867 6.681 -1.7898 -1.084 0.2485 0.153 
l/AK(hen) 15.4805 7.896 0.8741 0.648 2.8456 2.159 
l/AK(hub) 7.4589 7.118 2.0537 2.723 3.4284 4.785 
l/AK(hun) 9.6607 12.301 1.7357 2.904 3.0143 5.413 
l/AK(gd) 8.2380 4.773 2.3566 1-962 3.9296 3.345 
l/AK(gx) 5.4371 5.350 0.7133 1.000 1.5010 2.133 
l/AK(sc) 16.8300 9.613 5.7452 4.902 7.5550 6.647 
l/AK(gz) 2.4300 9.153 1.0404 5.747 1.3324 7.629 
l/AK(shnx) 6.4849 6.714 -0.9302 -1.404 0.0133 0.020 
l/AK(gs) 6.2230 3.495 -0.2223 -0.184 U 1 7 6 0.938 
l/AK(nx) 1.4214 9.587 0.2397 2.091 0.4874 4.699 
hiL 0.0675 2.023 0.3863 4.256 0.5111 10.166 
SAGR -0.7695 -5.263 -0.7151 -7.596 -0.7590 -8.147 
SNS 0.2078 0.883 0.5752 7.009 0.5005 6.167 
SG -2.0799 -9.721 -0.6359 -4.553 -0.7898 -5.663 
D66 -2.2402 -8.559 -0.1239 -7.206 -0.1344 -7.859 
D79 0.1031 3.145 0.0777 4.081 -0.0847 4.459 
D84 0.2567 7.958 0.1735 8,943 0.1754 9.183 
D89 -0.0038 0.109 0.0026 0.130 -0.0002 -0.099 




(1) DM, DE, DC, DW stand for the dummy variables of three municipalities, eastern region, central region 
and westem region of China respectively; 
(2) T represents the time variable; 
(3) D1966, D1979, D1984, D1989 represent the dummy variable of the period 1966-1969, 1979-，1984-’ 
and 1989-1990. 
* the abbreviation (in brackets) is the identity code of the province; 
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